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Congressional Diversions: Legislative
Responses to the Estate Valuation Freeze
By WAYNE M. GAZUR*




W HILE THE HISTORY of the United States federal wealth transfer
taxation system has been largely tranquil, it has nonetheless been
punctuated with bouts of fundamental change. 2 The most sweeping re-
forms were those introduced with the Tax Reform Act of 1976.1 A coun-
tering legislative upheaval arrived five years later in the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA"), 4 which could be considered a re-
peal of the system for all but a relatively small number of taxpayers.
5
The future of the taxes has generated a great debate, at least among
membersof the academic community. 6 One viewpoint maintains that
* Lecturer in Law and Business, University of Colorado at Boulder. B.S., University of
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acknowledges the research assistance of Cynthia A. Heiner, M.S., C.P.A., and John Chun and
Rebecca Hall, law students at the University of Colorado at Boulder. The author would like to
express his appreciation for the manuscript preparation support of the secretarial staff of the
University of Colorado School of Law, in particular Joanna K. Rose, and for the helpful com-
ments of Professor Robert L. Palmer.
1. Reprinted in W. MIEDER, THE PRENTICE-HALL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD PROV-
ERBS 268 (1986).
2. See S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX-
ATION 4-12 (succ. ed. 1987) for a historical account of American wealth transfer taxation. See
also Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation of the Transfer of Wealth, 19 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 1 (1983).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
4. ERTA, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
5. Prior to the 1981 amendments, only 2.8% of resident decedents incurred an estate tax
liability. While that relatively small percentage reflects the concentration of wealth in the
United States, it was estimated that only 0.3% of resident decedents would incur estate tax
liability under the post-ERTA law. See Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes
After ER TA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1207-08 (1983).
6. The American public, however, does not seem to be particularly interested in the
debate. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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the system has failed to achieve its stated objectives and should therefore
be eliminated. 7 Others reject the basic premise that a government should
tax gifts and inheritances, and urge repeal on that basis.8 Influential
groups such as the American Bar Association have apparently accepted
the continued existence of the wealth transfer taxation system, but have
argued for stability in this area of the law through selective technical
refinements. 9 Some scholarly commentators would address perceived in-
adequacies, particularly those exacerbated by the ERTA amendments,
through more fundamental changes to the current system. 10 Others have
proposed entirely new systems, such as an accessions tax'" or a periodic
wealth tax. 
2
The purpose of this article is to examine recent congressional efforts
with respect to wealth transfer taxation as demonstrated by the Revenue
Act of 198711 and Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
("TAMRA") 14 restrictions on the so-called "estate valuation freeze."
This article suggests that the new legislation, which wiil likely be unsuc-
cessful in a reform sense and insignificant as an additional source of reve-
nue, serves only to divert the attention of Congress from effective reform
of the wealth transfer taxation system.
"Reform" does not have to be a prescription for complexity. Inte-
gration of necessary reforms with the income tax, or its ultimate replace-
ment, consistent with revenue base broadening, for example, could be
one way to introduce more fundamental fairness to the income tax, with
overall simplification and increased revenues as added dividends. Re-
form, however, will require a change in congressional behavior toward
the taxation of wealth transfers. This article, therefore, will first discuss
the wealth transfer taxation environment and the possibilities for reform.
7. See, e.g., Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1215 (1984).
8. See generally R. WAGNER, INHERITANCE AND THE STATE (1977); G. GILDER,
WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981).
9. See Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Report on -Transfer, Tax Restructur-
ing, A.B.A. Sec. Taxation, reprinted in 41 TAX LAW. 395 (1988) [hereinafter ABA Proposals].
10. See, e.g., Gutman, supra note 5. See also Gutman, A Comment On The ABA Tax
Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 653 (1988).
11. See infra note 67.
12. See Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoid-
ance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977).
13. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 10000-10714,
101 Stat. 1330, 1330-430 - 1330-472.
14. TAMRA, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342.
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I. Reforming the Wealth Transfer Taxation System
A. Patterns of Congressional Behavior
The enactment of broad technical reform legislation followed in
close order by more definitive amending legislation has marked past con-
gressional behavior in the wealth transfer taxation area. For example,
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Byrum' 5 resulted in a
poorly drafted, sweeping legislative response in the Tax Reform Act of
1976.16 Congress responded to criticism of the statute with an amend-
ment in 1978.17 Although the current anti-Byrum provision may no
longer suffer from overbreadth or complexity, one might question if it
accomplishes anything of significance. 8
The provisions for gifts in contemplation of death also followed a
pattern of well-intentioned beginnings, only to have repeated amend-
ments reduce the statute to one of limited application. 19 The generation-
15. 408 U.S. 125 (1972). The Court held that closely held corporate stock owned by an
irrevocable trust was not includable in the estate of the settlor despite his retention of the
power to: (1) vote the stock, (2) veto the transfer by the trustee of any of the stock, (3) remove
the trustee and appoint a successor, and (4) veto investments and reinvestments. Id. at 150.
The decision presented new estate tax avoidance possibilities for the owners of closely held
corporations. See, e.g., Tankskerley, Estate Tax and the Closely Held Corporation - A Nearly
Fatal Blow to Section 2036, 51 N.C.L. REV. 325 (1972).
16. Section 2009(a), (e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, amended I.R.C. § 2036(a)
with the following language referring to the I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) "retained string" arising from
retained "possession or enjoyment of" transferred property: "For purposes of paragraph (1),
the retention of voting rights in retained stock shall be considered to be a retention of the
enjoyment of such stock." Id. The statute was perceived as overbroad because it was not
limited to the closely held corporation scenario presented in Byrum. On the other hand, the
technical retention of voting rights could possibly be circumvented by a settlor's transfer of
cash to a trust with the trust (of which the settlor was a trustee) in turn acquiring the closely
held stock. See, e.g., Newman & Kalter, Retention of Corporate Voting Rights.- Some Com-
ments on the Tax Reform Act Amendment, 55 TAXES 263 (1977).
17. In the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(i)(2) 92 Stat. 2763, 2931,
Congress deleted the language added to I.R.C. § 2036(a) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and
enacted the current I.R.C. § 2036(b) (Supp. V 1987).
18. If the perceived evil of Byrum was the retention of voting rights in the transferred
shares, this could still be accomplished under I.R.C. § 2036(b) by recapitalizing the corpora-
tion, retaining voting preferred or common stock, and transferring only non-voting common.
Even before the Revenue Act of 1978 amendments, which were accompanied by legislative
history permitting use of voting and non-voting stock, commentators discussed the use of vot-
ing and non-voting stock as an avoidance device. See Note, The Applicability of Section
2036(a) To Retained Voting Rights Devices After The Tax Reform Act of 1976, 19 B.C.L. REV.
597 (1978). Moreover, I.R.C. § 2036(b) by its terms applies only to corporations. A partner-
ship might be utilized to accomplish the same result proscribed for corporations by the amend-
ments. See McCord, The 1978 Anti-Byrum Amendment. A Cruel Hoax, 14 INST. ON EST.
PLAN. 1200 (1980).
19. The slow death of I.R.C. § 2035 should not be mourned by many in view of the
legacy of litigation that it fostered. However, it took the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Reve-
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skipping transfer tax appears to have risen above its complex but loop-
hole-ridden childhood by its transformation into a complex, refined stat-
ute prospectively touching only the very wealthy or ill-advised.
20
"Prospectively" should be emphasized; the generation-skipping transfer
tax may never really have an effect on anyone. When originally enacted
in 1976, the law grandfathered existing generation-skipping trusts, such
that the Joint Staff estimated that the provisions would not be fully effec-
tive for fifty years.21 One could add more years to that estimate; when
the generation-skipping transfer tax was amended by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, the prior statute was repealed retroactively, with the new
statute applying only prospectively to transfers after the new date of en-
actment, with few exceptions.
22
The estate marital tax deduction is for general public consumption,
that is if one can even consider the small number of potential taxable
estates as representative of the general public. 23 Nevertheless, it is a
complex and technical statute which has drawn the ire of even the legal
scriveners.
24
nue Act of 1978, ERTA, and the Technical Corrections Act of 1982 to accomplish the mis-
sion, leaving a statute which is drafted in a manner best described as highly confusing. See S.
SURREY, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 260-75, for a detailed account of the
tortured history of the section.
20. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663. The generation-skipping transfer tax provisions were intro-
duced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Criticized as overly broad and complex on one hand,
the tax scheme suffered from broad gaps, such as the failure to address outright intergenera-
tional transfers. See, e.g., Belknap, Planning Under the Generation-Skipping Tax, 19 B.C.L.
REV. 433 (1978). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 retroactively repealed I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663,
replacing it with a more comprehensive, yet still complex statute. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1433(b)-(d), 100 Stat. 2731-32. Due to a number of exemptions, the new
statute is definitely targeted at only very significant transactions. For example, until January
1, 1990, transfers to a grandchild, which do not in the aggregate exceed $2 million for such
grandchild, are exempt. Moreover, I.R.C. § 2631 gives each individual a lifetime generation-
skipping tax exemption as a transferor in the amount of $1 million.
21. Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 303, 326
n.43 (1976).
22. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 retroactively repealed the prior generation-skipping tax
and substituted a new statute. The new statute generally applies to any generation-skipping
transfer made after the date of enactment, October 22, 1986. The statute contains certain
special exceptions. Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1433(b)-(d).
23. See supra note 5.
24. In the American Bar Association Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, the Task
Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring included as an example of complexity a typical marital
deduction will clause, stating: "We submit that a testator, even if above average intelligence, is
unlikely to understand, or if he was once told, to remember, all that such a will clause is
intended to accomplish." See ABA PROPOSALS, supra note 9, at 396. In commenting on the
practicing bars complaints concerning the complexity of the generation-skipping transfer pro-
visions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Professor Surrey noted, "The various bar groups were
of no assistance, for their input was a pious urging of caution and really no action lest the
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If a pattern is discernible, it is one of patchwork amendments. With
respect to complexity, the result is one of uneven application with no
apparent regard for the sophistication of the affected taxpayer or the im-
portance of the intended result. Some of the confusion in the wealth
transfer taxation provisions has been attributed to undue legislative
haste. 25 As discussed later in this article, the recent efforts of Congress in
the wealth transfer taxation area have suffered from such haste. The fre-
quent but largely technical tinkering with the statutory language may, in
part, also be reflective of the legislative "incrementalism" best demon-
strated by the income tax.
26
Incrementalism would also explain the tax reduction bias in recent
legislation. 27 For example, substantial revenue losses were created by the
statute become too complex, though why lawyers capable of producing the complex provisions
of these trusts were worried about complexity, must remain a mystery." Surrey, supra note 21,
at 325.
25. "The law cannot, in ex-President Hoover's analogy, be made 'as clear as the Ten
Commandments.' So it is hardly strange that these provisions of the statute are no better than
they are. They have been moulded out of conflict and in emergencies." R. PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 283 (1942). It has been noted that:
The 1976 legislation was the product of an unusual legislative procedure and
this resulted in a number of technical difficulties surviving in the statutory language
.... The result of this procedure was that the technical refinement in the statutory
language that typically occurs as the result of Senate Finance Committee Hearings
on a House-passed bill did not take place with respect to the estate and gift tax
changes enacted in 1976. Nor did the Senate get its usual opportunity to amend the
bill during floor debate. The statutory changes reflected both the detriments and
benefits of this unusual procedure.
S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 9.
26. J. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(1985). Professor Witte's treatise tracks the development of the income tax, finding a consis-
tent pattern. The foremost pattern is incrementalism, that the legislative process works slowly
in steps and radical changes are filtered out. The changes, rather than sweeping, are often
directed at specific abuses. He states:
Thus, at any point in time, decisions on tax policy fulfill most of the conditions
of the incremental model. They lead to primarily marginal variations in existing
structures, with little time spent in consideration of radical proposals; they are reme-
dial in nature, responding to general or particular needs or problems, either within
the tax system or without; innovations are often based on or are direct copies of old
proposals; and there appears to be an ongoing process of adjustment as new values
and objectives are introduced or unforeseen consequences emerge. In all of these
respects the structure of the tax code is well suited to the incremental process.
Id. at 247.
Some have asserted that the level of technical complexity and loophole closing behavior
exhibited by recent legislation is due to the abdication of tax-writing to young staff members,
some of whom "have personal tax 'reform' agendas that they intend to see Congress adopt."
Pennell, Is Legislative Change Inevitable?, 128 TR. & EST. 26 (1989).
27. Professor Witte has stated that:
At any given time the equilibrium position, represented by the current status of
tax laws is under constant pressure toward less rather than more taxes. This is
Fall 1989] CONGRESSIONAL DIVERSIONS
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Tax Reform Act of 1976 and ERTA wealth transfer taxation changes, 28
followed by smaller revenue gains generated by the Revenue Act of 1987
and TAMRA amendments.
29
If legislative incrementalism is a factor in wealth transfer taxation,
fundamental changes to the wealth transfer taxation system may be too
radical at this time.30 One does not have to be much of a cynic to con-
clude that most citizens do not care about this type of reform a.3  Unlike
the income tax, application of the wealth transfer tax is reserved for a
few 32 and, except for inter vivos gifts and multiple generation skips, it is
somewhat more inconspicuous by being imposed only once. If the
wealth transfer system is to be reformed by anything short of a Great
Depression, which would, for example, stir wealth redistribution rheto-
ric, 3 3 any reform movement would probably be subdued. The commen-
hardly a startling conclusion: The United States has always been a 'tight' tax coun-
try, and if the present conservative trend is any indication, the idea that large-scale
government is a permanent feature in modern society has not yet bjen accepted.
J. WITTE, supra note 26, at 249.
An exception to the general tax reduction bias is found in periods of war or other emer-
gencies which force Congress to raise revenues. Id. at 248-49.
28. The revenue losses of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 wealth transfer tax provisions were
estimated as increasing from $728 million in 1978 to $1.449 billion in 1981. JOINT EXPLANA-
TORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1515,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 399, 626, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4118,
4264. This probably was understated overall because the revenue gains provided by the carry-
over basis provisions were lost upon its repeal, and the generation-skipping transfer taxes were
ultimately repealed retroactively. See supra note 22. The revenue loss estimates for the wealth
transfer tax provisions of ERTA increased from $204 million in 1982 to $5.568 billion in 1986.
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMIT-FEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 97-215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 195, 289, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 285, 377.
29. See infra note 131.
30. As discussed in the textual material that follows, fundamental reforms to the system
of wealth transfer taxation may not be a practical possibility due to the apathy of the American
electorate, coupled with the Treasury Department's apparent recognition of the relative insig-
nificance of the revenue generating capabilities of any such changes. The introduction to the
American Bar Association Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring Proposals reflects a careful,
studied approach in its summary of the comments received by the Task Force. Some com-
ments considered complexity to be the worst feature of the system. Others observed that any
change is complexity, and found more need for repose in the transfer taxes than in the income
tax. This latter position was summarized by the Task Force: "At a minimum, if transfer tax
revision must be attempted, it should be done carefully and with adequate opportunity for
outside study and comment before enactment." ABA PROPOSALS, supra note 9, at 395.
31. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Law school administrations apparently
reflect this apathy in the reported shrinkage of the ranks of full-time estate planning faculty.
See Pennell, Finding Future Estate Planners, 127 TR, & EST. 20 (1988).
32. See supra note 5.
33. Even the Great Depression era debates might have been largely rhetoric, obscuring
objectives based on fiscal exigency. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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tators who advocate incremental changes to the current system, an
example being the American Bar Association proposals,3 4 have perhaps
correctly appraised the political realities.
B. Reform and the Unique Wealth Transfer Taxation Environment:
Why Such a Tax?
Professor Surrey listed the three ingredients n~cessary for genuine
tax reform as "a public interested in tax reform, a moderate-liberal Con-
gress willing to respond to that interest, and an executive branch really
concerned to achieve tax reform and provide leadership."'35 With respect
to the latter factor, the recent Republican National Platforms have con-
sistently promised limits on the application of the estate and gift taxes.
36
With respect to the first factor, upon which the second and third factors
ultimately turn, the American public, as discussed below, is apparently
apathetic to the issue of wealth transfer tax reform.
1. Revenue Significance
Despite the deceptive complexity of the operative estate and gift tax
provisions and the resources spent by the government and taxpayers
alike in planning for, complying with, administering, and litigating these
provisions and resulting issues, these taxes are not significant sources of
revenue. In 1986, for example, the estate and gift tax receipts were $7.2
billion, less than one percent of all federal revenues.3 7 By comparison, in
34. See supra note 9.
35. Surrey, supra note 21, at 330.
36. The 1980 platform attacked "[t]he heavy estate tax burden imposed on the American
people [which] is threatening the life savings of millions of our families, forcing spouses and
children to sell their homes, businesses, and family farms to pay the estate taxes. To encourage
continuity of family ownership, we will seek to ease this tax burden on all Americans and
abolish excessive inheritance taxes to allow families to retain and pass on their small businesses
and family farms." Republican National Convention, 1980 Republican National Convention
Platform 18 (July 15, 1980).
This promise was fulfilled with the tax reductions enacted with ERTA. See Gutman,
supra note 5. The theme continued with the 1984 platform. "We oppose any scheme to roll
back the estate tax cuts and will seek further reductions for family businesses." Republican
National Convention, 1984 Republican National Convention Platform 5 (Aug. 20, 1984).
The,1988 message was more general. "We oppose any attempts to increase taxes." Re-
publican National Convention, Republican Platform 10 (Aug. 16, 1988). "We will not allow
liberal Democrats to imperil the other gains the elderly have made during the Reagan-Bush
Administration: ... We dramatically cut estate taxes so surviving spouses will not have to sell
off the property they worked a lifetime to enjoy just to pay the IRS." Id. at 28-29. The
restrictions on the estate valuation freeze were not driven by the Reagan Administration or
Treasury, who reportedly opposed the measures. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
37. The exact figure is 0.9%. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, reprinted
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the same year, the corporate and individual income taxes raised $497
billion. 38 It has been noted that an amount equal to the wealth transfer
tax yield could be generated by a one percent increase in the federal indi-
vidual income tax rates.39 Moreover, based on the reported gross estates
for estate tax returns filed in 1983, a 100 percent tax would yield approxi-
mately $50 billion, 40 which in terms of 1986 tax revenues, would consti-
tute only six percent of the total.
Because the estate tax return amounts omit personal wealth, such as
interests in trusts and life insurance that easily avoid inclusion, the poten-
tial revenue base is understated. The value of privately held wealth in
1976 was estimated at $5 trillion. 41 Coupling this with an estimated an-
nual turnover of three percent through deaths, the potential annual tax
base has been estimated at about $150 billion,42 three times the 1983 tax
return amounts. However, even with tax base broadening one may be
inclined to agree with Professors Richard and Peggy Musgrave, who
state, "even drastic efforts in this direction [base broadening] would
hardly render the estate tax a major revenue producer relative to other
sources, such as the income, property, or sales tax. The reason is that
death is too infrequent an event.
' '43
2. Social Redistribution Goals
The stated purpose of federal estate and gift taxes is not limited to
revenue collection. The primary purpose originally advanced by its pro-
ponents was one of wealth leveling and wealth redistribution. 44 In that
regard, although the distribution of wealth has reportedly become less
in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, No. 487 (108th ed. 1988).
38. Id. If one excludes excise and employment taxes from the computation, the estate
and gift taxes are still only 1.4% of the total.
39. Jatscher, The Aims of Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES, AND FAMILY PROPERTY
41 (E. Halbach ed. 1977) [hereinafter DEATH AND TAXES]. The revenue yields of the taxes
were greatest during the Great Depression years of 1935-1940. The percentages for the years
1935-1940 were 6.49, 10.84, 6.59, 7.39, 6.99, and 6.76, respectively. The 10.84% amount was
somewhat of an aberration. See Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, II TAX L.
REV. 223, 239 n. 94 (1956). The revenue yield has never exceeded 3% of total internal revenue
receipts since that time. S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 42, fig. 1.
40. Id. at fig. 2.
41. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 489-
90 (4th ed. 1984).
42. Id.
43, Id.
44. President Theodore Roosevelt and industrialist Andrew Carnegie were early advo-
cates of estate and gift taxes as tools of social policy to discourage excessive concentrations of
wealth. See R. PAUL, supra note 25, at 31-33 for a historical of this aspect of the taxes.
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concentrated in the last fifty years, there is some question as to whether
the estate and gift tax system can take any credit for this development.
45
Other evidence suggests that the distribution of wealth is becoming even
more unequal. 46 As discussed below, significant redistribution of wealth
may not be realized through the wealth transfer taxes, or any taxes for
that matter, because public sentiment does not support such a goal.
Ironically, although the taxes seem to be ineffective or have little effect,
the critics of wealth transfer taxes continue to attack the system as a
legalized manifestation of envy by the general public, which stifles initia-
tive and ignores the dynamic nature of American wealth and the eco-
nomic need for a wealthy investor group.
47
3. Added Progressivity
Another justification expressed for the estate tax is that it lends fur-
ther progressivity to the income tax.48 This argument sees the estate tax
as the final "backstop" for the income tax system with its various loop-
holes and tax incentives. 49 All other factors being equal, a more direct
approach to income tax progressivity and loopholes would seem more
desirable than a one-time, one-shot, upon death treatment. Also, with
the withering of wealth transfer tax influence produced by the ERTA,
this perceived increased progressivity is claimed to have been reduced
45. According to Professor James D. Smith, "Wealth in the United States has become
less concentrated in the last half century. Both the diminution is not great, and it all occurred
in periods when the market system was functioning under duress or was in administration
abeyance, specifically the Great Depression and World War II." The Distribution and Compo-
sition of Wealth Holdings and Their Implications for Estate Tax Reform: Hearings on Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1314-1318 (1976), reprinted in S. SURREY, P.
MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 50. See also Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes
Affect Wealth Distribution?, 117 TR. & EST. 598 (1978), in which the author concludes that the
estate and gift taxes have had no discernible impact on personal wealth distribution or concen-
tration since 1949. The author, however, noted: "The most that can be said, therefore, is that
but for the present transfer tax system, the percentage of wealth in the hands of the top five
percent of the population would be increasing at an additional rate of less than 0.5 percent per
year." Verbit, supra, at 607.
46. More recent statistics indicate that [the top 0.5 percent of the U.S. population
owned 35 percent of the country's wealth and 43 percent if personal homes are excluded."
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Re-
action, 86 MicH. L. REV. 465, 482 n. 69 (1987).
47. See generally R. WAGNER and G. GILDER, supra note 8.
48. See generally Gutman, Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 253 (1982).
49. "If the income tax fails to do its job, only the estate tax can assure an eventual day of
reckoning." Eisenstein, supra note 39, at 257. See also E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION
135 (10th ed. 1925).
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from twelve percent for years prior to the 1981 amendments to four per-
cent for years thereafter.
50
4. Minimized Inhibition of Economic Incentives
The preservation of private economic incentives has been a long-
standing issue in taxation. Former Treasury Secretary Mellon's state-
ments of the early 1920's could be used in the supply-side economics
debates of the 1980's:
Taxpayers subject to the higher rates cannot afford, for example,
to invest in American railroads or industries or embark upon new en-
terprises in the face of taxes that will take 50 percent or more of any
return that may be realized. These taxpayers are withdrawing their
capital from productive business and investing it instead in tax exempt
securities and adopting other lawful methods of avoiding the realiza-
tion of taxable income. The result is to stop business transactions that
would normally go through, and to discourage men of wealth from
taking the risks which are incidental to the development of new
business .
5 '
Assuming that a given level of tax revenues is required, an estate tax may
be less of a burden on incentives and savings than an income tax,
52
although "[n]o conclusion as to the effects of estate and gift taxation on
incentives can be more than a guess." 53
5. Public Sentiment
One commentator has asserted that the wealth redistribution debate
of the Great Depression years "was more verbal than actual,"' 54 and con-
cludes that the changes to the estate tax produced by that period, were
50. See Gutman, supra note 48, at 261-62.
51. Quoted in R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 134-35 (1954).
52. One articulation of such a theory is as follows:
Opinions about death taxes vary greatly in a society relying on private incentives
for economic growth. Some believe that these taxes hurt economic incentives, reduce
saving, and undermine the economic system. But even they would concede that
death taxes have less adverse effects on incentives than do income taxes of equal
yield. Income taxes reduce the return from effort and risk taking as income is
earned, whereas death taxes are paid only after a lifetime of work and accumulation
and are likely to be given less weight by individuals in their work, saving, and invest-
ment decisions.
J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 234-235 (5th ed. 1987).
See also C. SHoUP, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 234-236 (1966); A. TAIT, THE
TAXATION OF PERSONAL WEALTH 173-190 (1967); Jatscher, supra note 39, at 40-46; H.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 144 (1938). But see Boskin, An Economist's Perspec-
tive on Estate Taxation, in DEATH AND TAXES, supra note 39, at 56.
53. B. BITTKER & E. CLARK, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION xxviii (5th ed.
1984).
54. Eisenstein, supra note 39, at 237.
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primarily imposed for revenue. 5 With respect to the income tax, Profes-
sor Witte has concluded that "there is no evidence either that the income
tax significantly redistributes income or that there was ever any sustained
intention that income taxes should redistribute income."' 56 It should
therefore come as no surprise that the sentiment of the public toward
wealth redistribution through the tax system seems to be one of apathy.
5 7
Some have attributed this to the "with pluck and luck" optimism of the
American public that considers everyone a potential subject of the tax.
58
If these observations are accurate, an avenue may exist for wealth trans-
fer tax changes based on pragmatic, revenue raising and simplification
considerations, rather than through a broad-based call for reform.
C. The Direction of Reform'
1. Abolition
In view of the unmet objectives of the estate and gift tax, some have
suggested that it be abolished.5 9 In that regard, it has been suggested
that the ineffective and insignificant system has been permitted to muddle
along merely to maintain an illusion of wealth redistribution. 60  Main-
55. Id. at 238.
56. J. WITTE, supra note 26, at 257-59.
57. Professor Witte describes the results of a number of public opinion surveys concern-
ing progressive taxation and wealth redistribution. A 1976 Harris Poll asked for agreement or
disagreement with the statement that "the federal government try to make a fairer distribution
of wealth in the country." Although admittedly not directed at wealth transfer taxation as
such, 47% of the respondents opposed the measure, 37% supported it, and 16% offered no
opinion. WITTE, supra note 26, at 353. Although there may be apathy with respect to elimi-
nating loopholes, certain groups such as the farm and small business lobbies can be incredibly
vocal in attacking wealth transfer taxes. This was particularly true in the 1981 legislative
process where Congress was moved to act on the basis of apparently very little hard evidence
that a real problem existed. See Gutman, supra note 5, at 1197-1202 & 1209-12.
58. This phenomenon is discussed below:
The most puzzling political obstacle to estate tax revision, however, is that the
American people do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests. George McGovern's
proposal in 1972 to confiscate inheritances above a certain amount was not well re-
ceived, and a recent California initiative to repeal the state's inheritance tax garnered
a sixty-four percent positive vote .... The only convincing explanation that has
occurred to me for this phenomenon lies in the optimism of the American people. In
California, at least, sixty-four percent of the people must believe that they will be in
the wealthiest five to ten percent when they die.
Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 285 (1983).
59. See, e.g., Dobris, supra note 7.
60. Such an illusion is noted below:
The poor are often delighted to see the wealth and income of the rich reduced
even if they are not thereby monetarily benefitted. The total sum of happiness in this
country might conceivably be increased if the wealth of the rich were simply de-
stroyed rather than shifted (a possible motivation for the excesses of the French
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taining appearances aside, abolition of the system without offering a sub-
stitute would be a mistake. First, the $7.2 billion revenue yield of the
taxes is not a trivial amount in any sense, even when viewed in the con-
text of the United States federal budget. 61 In addition, with certain re-
forms that yield could almost be doubled or tripled. 62 Second, if one is
choosing between the wealth transfer taxes and the income tax in raising
revenues, a death tax is less of a disincentive to saving and investment.
Third, the incidence of the wealth transfer taxes falls upon the recipient
of the gift or bequest, and it is probably indefensible, from the standpoint
Revolution). Of course, happiness should also be increased if most people had the
illusion of destruction, which may be a good argument for retaining stiff wealth
transfer taxes while simultaneously riddling the tax structure with such loopholes as
the (now repealed) orphan's deduction.
Robinson, The Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes - A Requiem?, 1 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 25, 39-40
(1982).
"Abolition would be seen as a giveaway; therefore, something must be left in place."
Dobris, supra note 7, at 1231. Professor Cooper has stated that:
In sum, because estate tax avoidance is such a successful and yet wasteful pro-
cess, one suspects that the present estate and gift tax serves no purpose other than to
give reassurance to the millions of unwealthy that entrenched wealth is being at-
tacked. The attack is, however, more cosmetic than real and the economy is paying
the price of fettered capital and distorted property ownership for this tax
cosmetology.
Cooper, supra note 12, at 223.
61. The following are examples of estimated 1987 federal outlays that could be paid for
by the "trifling" $7 to 20 billion potential of the wealth transfer taxation system.
(1) International development and humanitarian assistance - $4.3 billion; (2)
Foreign information and exchange - $1.0 billion; (3) Health research - $5.6 bil-
lion; (4) Consumer and occupational health and safety - $1.2 billion; (5) Elemen-
tary, secondary, and vocational education - $7.9 billion; (6) Higher education -
$7.4 billion; (7) Pollution control and abatement - $4.9 billion; (8) Energy conserva-
tion - $0.3 billion; (9) Federal judicial activities - $2.6 billion; (10) Federal law
enforcement - $4.6 billion; (1I) Federal correctional activities - $0.8 billion.
U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, ANNUAL, reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 471 (108th
ed. 1988).
62. Reconsidering the proposals for carryover basis or a tax at death on unrealized appre-
ciation would reopen the debate concerning the I.R.C. § 1014 basis adjustment at death. That
debate needs to be reopened. See Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of the Transfer
Tax System, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 297 (1981). The revenue loss from this inconsistent and
unsupportable loophole was estimated as $5.7 billion in 1987 alone. See, U.S. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT, ANNUAL, reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 475 (108th ed. 1988). Based on
1966 levels of gifts and inheritances and income tax rates (which were much higher), Professor
McNulty noted that the revenue from the taxation of estates and gifts could almost be tripled
by taxing such amounts as income. See McNulty, Fundamental Alternatives to Present Trans-
fer Tax Systems, in DEATH AND TAXES, supra note 39, at 98.
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of economic theory63 or the simple notion of an unearned windfall, 64 that
the recipient should avoid any tax on such a receipt, regardless of what
the tax is called.
Many would still add enhanced wealth redistribution to the list of
justifications for taxing wealth transfers in seeking a remedy for per-
ceived social ills.65 This justification has been the principal one tradition-
ally advanced in support of such taxes, but it has apparently never been
embraced by the American public or been implemented in the wealth
transfer taxation system in a meaningful way. However, even if such
social changes were never to occur, taxation of wealth transfers would be
desirable both on economic terms and from the standpoint of revenue
raising. Today's goal, therefore, should be to enhance the fairness of ap-
plication, efficiency and revenue raising potential of the taxes. 66
2. Alternatives
A number of scholarly articles that go beyond technical refinements
of the present system, have been devoted to proposals for new systems of
wealth transfer taxation. A summary of the main issues surrounding
these proposals follows below:
a. The Accessions Tax
An accessions tax67 on cumulative lifetime gifts and inheritances
would essentially operate like an inheritance tax, with the amount of the
63. H. SIMONS, supra note 52, at 125-47. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note
41, at 334-35.
64. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 134-35; Jatscher, supra note 39, at 49-51.
65. "Excessive unearned wealth, however, may arouse deep-seated resentment, and possi-
bly alienation from society, over someone's 'getting something for nothing.' " FINAL REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, in DEATH AND
TAXES, supra note 39, at 184. A correlation has been drawn between property crime and
feelings of relative deprivation by others. The argument is that a more level wealth distribu-
tion would reduce the perceived inequalities and anti-social feelings. See R. CHESTER, INHER-
ITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY (1982). "1 think we should accept the idea that revenue
raising is not an important job of the transfer tax and focus exclusively on the societal aspects
of the tax." Dobris, supra note 7, at 1232. "Do not accepted moral principles call for continu-
ing and strengthening the death tax system?" PEDRICK, 19 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1900
(1985).
66. Even in focusing on revenue raising and consistent application of a tax, complete
neutrality is difficult to attain, and the social issues creep in. If the rates of tax are progressive,
for example, that reflects wealth redistribution policies. See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN,
JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953). The level and type of exemp-
tions and exclusions will unavoidably reflect such social policy judgments.
67. See, e.g., Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAX L. REV. 589 (1967). With
an accessions tax, the question of determining when a gift has occurred, or if property is in-
cluded in a decedent's estate, is avoided by simply looking to the amount of cash or other
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tax being determined with reference to the circumstances of the recipient.
This system can have strong appeal, because it provides a separate and
progressive rate structure, such that gifts and inheritances are taxed-on a
cumulative basis and at rates greater than those for other types of in-
come. Another claimed benefit of the accessions tax proposal is that it
should encourage wider dispersion of wealth to a greater number of peo-
ple due to its emphasis on taxation at the recipient's level. Moreover, a
degree of simplification is obtained with respect to property placed in
trust, likely the most complex issue of wealth transfer taxation, because
the donee is not taxed until cash or property is actually received.
68
A major drawback of the proposal, however, is that it would require
the creation and maintenance of a new and separate accessions tax sys-
tem. Consequently, one must question whether the attendant compli-
ance and administrative costs of implementing and maintaining such a
system are justified.
b. Wealth Tax
A wealth tax has been advocated by some writers, 69 and, as typically
proposed, it would periodically levy a relatively low rate of tax on a tax-
payer's total wealth after limited exemptions. Of all the proposals, the
wealth tax would most effectively counter estate valuation freezes be-
cause both the transferor and transferee would be taxed on their accre-
tions of wealth. A wealth tax suffers from a number of practical
drawbacks,7 0 however, not the least of which would be a lack of political
palatability and almost certain constitutional objections. 71
property or benefits in the hands of the recipient. This is the long-standing question of the
multiple meanings of "gift" as used in the context of the gift, estate, and income tax. Commis-
sioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942) ("Gift .. .gaft .. .or geft"). An-
drews' proposal recognizes that accumulation trusts could pose an abuse to this system, so an
additional special tax would be levied on transfers into trust, for which a distributee could
receive a partial credit as distributions were actually made. Such a tax injects some complexity
into the system in differentiating between revocable trusts (what will be considered "revoca-
ble"?) for which a tax would not be payable, and all other trusts. See also Rudick, A Proposal
For an Accessions Tax, I TAX L. REV. 25 (1945); Rudick, What Alternative to the Estate and
Gift Taxes?, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 150 (1950); Halbach, An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 211 (1988). But see Kirshberg, The Accessions Tax: Administrative Bram-
blebush or Instrument of Social Policy?, 14 UCLA L. REV. 135 (1966).
68. Andrews, supra note 67, at 591-92. The trust issue aside, the accessions tax would
still need to wrestle with the estate valuation limiting devices discussed later in this article.
Those techniques could be used to defer the accessions tax liability.
69. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 12, at 244-46.
70. An annual wealth tax raises valuation, privacy, and liquidity concerns, among others.
71. A wealth tax would probably require a constitutional amendment to exempt it from
the requirement that direct taxes be apportioned. See infra note 176.
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c. Integrated Income or Consumption Tax
Repeal of the estate and gift tax system, followed by its integration
into the individual income tax system or a consumption tax system, is
another alternative. 72 In the income tax proposal integration would be
effected by repealing the present income tax exclusion provided by Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 102, and the income tax basis adjustment upon
death provided by Internal Revenue Code section 1014. The income tax
exclusion for life insurance proceeds would need to be addressed as part
of the process. Additionally, some excluiions for transfers, such as small
gifts and inheritances, marital transfers, 73 and support payments would
be required.
The income/consumption tax integration proposals appear to offer
more simplicity than the accessions tax because no separate system and
rate schedule is required. Not all difficulties will disappear, however.
For example, in dealing with property transferred in trust, rules will be
required to determine when a taxable inter vivos gift has occurred and
when a taxable inheritance has been received. Adoption of the tax upon
receipt concept of the accessions tax would tend to mitigate this problem,
however.
74
One psychological hurdle that must be overcome in adopting an in-
tegrated system is a desire for a wealth transfer system with steeply pro-
gressive rates, such as an accessions tax, computed on a cumulative
basis. 75 In an integrated system, it may be viewed as objectionable to tax
"unearned" income from gifts and inheritances on an equal footing with
other sources of income. 76 In addition, due to the flat tax nature of the
72. See, e.g., Andrews, A Consumption- Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income
Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980); R. MUSGRAVE & P: MUSGRAVE, supra note 41, 237-238;
Dodge, The Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers: Where Do We Go After ERTA?, 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 738 (1982); Gac & Brougham, A Proposal for Restructuring the Taxation of
Wealth Transfers. Tax Reform Redux?, 5 AKRON TAX J. 75 (1988); H. AARON & H.
GALPER, ASSESSING TAX REFORM (1975).
73. Under one proposal, spouses would be treated as a singletaxable unit, simplifying the
marital deduction concerns. See Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts
and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177; 1192-93 (1978).
74. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
75. One recent accessions tax proposal, however, has suggested that a flat rate of tax be
used. See Halbach, supra note, 67.
76. The bias against unearned income as opposed to earned income has been noted by
commentators for years. See, e.g., E. SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 134 ("It is now commonly
recognized that incomes from property should pay a higher rate. than incomes from labor.").
The income tax rate differential between earned and unearned income was discarded with
ERTA's enactment of a single maximum 50% marginal rate, as compared with the prior law
that taxed unearned income at a maximum marginal rate of 70%, and earned income at a
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current individual income tax rates, any added measure of progressivity
for gifts and inheritances would require increasing the general income tax
rate brackets, potentially presenting more complex and political issues.
This would be unacceptable from an incentive standpoint because all
other income would be subject to the increased rates. A compromise
could take the form of a separate, highly progressive cumulative income
tax rate schedule limited to gifts and inheritances. This would essentially
incorporate that aspect of the accessions tax into the income tax vehicle.
On the other hand, such a tax rate schedule could unnecessarily compli-
cate matters, thereby diminishing much of the desired simplification. 77
maximum marginal rate of 50%. It was hoped that the tax cut, as applied to unearned in-
come, would stimulate saving and investment. According to the Senate committee:
The committee also believes that the increase, resulting from marginal rate re-
ductions, in the after-tax return to saving will significantly increase personal saving,
thus insuring adequate financing for the additional investment encouraged by other
provisions of this bill .... Because the law already provides a special maximum tax
rate on earned income, this change is intended to eliminate a substantial disincentive
to investment.
S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 105, 132.
77. It can be suggested that a highly progressive wealth transfer tax rate schedule is an
illusion as applied under the current system and could be unnecessary or counter-productive.
First, for decedents dying in 1983, the highest marginal estate tax rate was 60%, payable
on taxable estates in excess of $3,500,000. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2)(C) (1982). The average rate of
tax reported on estate tax returns filed in 1983, however, could be roughly estimated as 20% of
the reported taxable estates. For the 1983 filing period, the taxable estates totaled
$26,235,000,000. The tax paid thereon was $5,170,000,000. S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL & H.
GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 42, fig. 2. Grouping the smaller estates with the larger estates might
underestimate the effective rate on larger estates. However, due to tax avoidance opportuni-
ties, Professor Cooper computed the average wealth transfer tax rate for certain DuPont fam-
ily members as 6%. See Cooper, supra note 12, at 215. Based on estate tax returns filed in
1985, the average tax rate (after state death tax credit) paid on gross estates in excess of $10
million was 13 percent. See U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME,
reprinted in J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 390 (5th ed. 1987) [hereinafter STATISTICS
OF INCOME].
Second, the current flat tax rate structure of the income tax might be modified to further
increase rates for upper income taxpayers, who would typically be the recipients of large gifts
or inheritances. That would add to progressivity.
Third, the flat tax rates could be somewhat of a blessing, because they simplify integration
of the wealth transfer tax without requiring a special averaging computation for substantial
one-time receipts.
Fourth, the integrated system considers other sources of income. Thus, if the emphasis is
on the recipient, the integrated system best determines the recipient's ability to pay the tax.
See Dodge, supra note 73.
Fifth, consideration of the recipient's other circumstances will deflect attempts to create
standard exemptions at such a level as to make the tax useless, thereby repeating the excesses
of ERTA. A very modest $30,000 lifetime gift and inheritance exemption, will be easier to
justify if the truly needy citizen, with little other income, will pay little or no income/consump-
tion tax on the gift or inheritance. On the other hand, it is difficult to justify any exemption for
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The integrated income/consumption tax would also need to grapple
with the problem of generation-skipping transfers. One response calls for
a separate tax levied on all trust property every thirty years.78 Moreover,
a consumption tax proposal has already recognized the necessity of ad-
dressing the estate valuation freeze, which is discussed later in this arti-
cle. 79  Nevertheless, integration could still offer some degree of
simplification, 80 improved equity, and additional revenues. One remain-
ing impediment to full integration with the income or consumption tax
base is the constitutionality of taxing gifts as income. One commentator
has argued that this issue can be resolved favorably.
8'
Any change from the present, albeit cumbersome, system will be
viewed, at least initially, as a source of new complexity and administra-
tion problems. The administrative costs of the present system have not
been concretely quantified,8 2 but some have speculated that the costs ex-
ceed the revenue yield. 83 Integration with the income tax would offer an
incremental political alternative to reform. Some benefits should accrue
a citizen with large amounts of other taxable income. By taking other income into account,
the call for extreme, debilitating exemptions broadly available to everyone can be avoided.
Sixth, added progressivity, coupled with deference for income sources other than gifts or
inheritances, could be enhanced through elimination of any gift or inheritance exemptions
once a certain level of gifts or inheritances is attained, coupled with a separate surtax com-
puted with respect to only the level of gifts and inheritances. The surtax, which is a contradic-
tion of the concept of considering other income, would be effective only at very substantial
levels, for example, receipts in excess of $500,000.
78. H. AARON & H. GALPER, supra note 72, at 95.
79. Id. at 96-97.
80. Simplification of the law has been expressed as one of the goals of recent proposals in
the income tax area. Complexity is seen as creating administrative burdens, undue reliance on
professional tax advice, and a perception of unfairness. See infra note 117. Professor Witte
echoes the same points:
[A] complex tax system has costs associated with it apart from the administra-
tion ones. Complicated systems require tax experts to compute and plan strategies
for individuals and organizations, thus reducing taxpayer understanding and divert-
ing resources to activities some consider unproductive. More important, complexity,
and the public's perception of that complexity, may affect the legitimacy of the tax
system. These consequences may extend to general attitudes toward the rule of law
and government actions and institutions.
J. WITTE, supra note 26, at 31.
81. See Dodge, supra note 73, at 1185 n.37.
82. The cost of administration of the overall tax system was determined as 48c for each
$100 collected. No separate costs were presented for the estate and gift tax. However, in 1985,
only 77,000 estate tax returns and 95,000 gift tax returns were filed. This is to be compared
with 99,425,795 individual returns and 3,302,627 corporate returns. 1985 IRS CoMMISSIONER
AND CHIEF COUNSEL, ANN. REP. [hereinafter 1985 ANNUAL REPORT].
83. Professor Gerald P. Moran estimated that the total cost of compliance with the
wealth transfer taxes "probably exceeds the yield that Uncle Sam receives." See Hudson,
supra note 2, at 32 n.174 (1983).
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due to use of an existing system; a system that the public may not com-
pletely understand, but one with which there is at least some
familiarity.84
The current dominance of the individual income tax as a revenue
source suggests where the future of wealth transfer taxation lies.
Although the income tax may evolve into a consumption tax or be sup-
plemented by a value added tax, it presently provides the most logical
avenue for reforming the wealth transfer tax system. Nonetheless, as the
following discussion suggests, recent congressional efforts with respect to
the estate valuation freeze indicate a continued willingness to grapple
only with the insignificant issues, leaving the important work to another
day.
II. Evolution of the Estate Valuation Freeze and the
Legislative Response
A. A Concept Attracts Attention
The use of different classes of corporate stock to accomplish estate
tax deferrals was discussed in the popular estate planning literature over
thirty-five years ago.8 5 The main concept underlying simple corporate
84. One loss of administrative efficiency may arise in the conversion to a recipient report-
ing system from the present donor/estate reporting system. In 1984, only 500 returns were
filed with gross estates in excess of $5 million, and 108.60% of these returns were audited.
Returns with gross estates under $1 million were audited 15.91% of the time, and those in the
$I million to $5 million range were audited 73.09% of the time. The 1984 overall audit per-
centage for individual tax returns was only 1.31%. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 82. If
the focus of the estate tax is shifted to the donee/recipient, the wealth transfers will be spread
among the almost 100 million individual returns and the associated low rate of audits, recog-
nizing that the audit rate is higher for higher incomes. Carl Shoup has made the argument
that donors may be more sophisticated and fewer in number than donees, and may have a
greater degree of compliance. The administrative aspect would therefore seem to favor report-
ing by the donor. C. SHOUP, supra note 52, at 29. If the admihistrative concern is met by
donor filing of a simplified Form 1099 informational return to supplement donee repotting,
then some of the simplicity and reduced paper flow advantages are reduced.
85. One of the first articles addressing corporate estate valuation freezes was published in
1953, Foosaner, Stockholder Estate Problems, 92 TR. & EST. 908 (1953), in which the author
described the use of different classes of stock, whether on formation or in a subsequent recapi-
talization, to facilitate intervivos gifting and testamentary dispositions to tamily members. The
article, and the related articles that followed in quick succession, focused primarily on the
practical estate planning advantages of recapitalizations, but also touched upon some of the
estate and gift tax considerations. See also Tremayne, Estate Planning for the Man with a
Business, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 40; Wormser, Preserving the Family Enterprise for the Family, 2
PRAC. LAW. 44 (1956); McKenney, Estate Planning for Business Interests, 95 TR. & EST. 212
(1956); Teschner, How to Use Recapitalizations to Effect Tax Planning Objectives, 6 J. TAX'N
322 (1957); Bogert & Chanen, The Family Business: Recapitalization for Estate Planning Pur-
poses, 40 CHI. B. REC. 347 (1959). Although these articles appear to be some of the first to
address the ability to transfer value and/or control in a family business with the effect of
(Vol. 24
restructuring blossomed to include a number of other arrangements, all
serving to effect tax avoidance; a phenomenon that became known as the
"estate valuation freeze."'86 The topic captured the attention of the prac-
ticing bar and scholars alike; generating a blizzard of legal discourse.87
The explosive inflation in values experienced by the holders of hard as-
sets during the 1970's undoubtedly contributed to the flurry of planning
activity and discussion. 88 Most of the literature enthusiastically touted
the various planning opportunities while cautioning readers of their tech-
nical pitfalls.8 9 Some of the scholarly discussion, however, sounded a
limiting both income and wealth transfer taxes, it appears that practitioners were employing
this estate planning technique as early as 1946. Professor Cooper, for example, discussed the
estate planning background of the decision in Estate of Salsbury v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1441 (1975), in which a preferred stock recapitalization was accomplished in 1946 as
the preparatory step in a plan of lifetime gifting of stock ownership. See Cooper, supra note
12, at 171-74.
86. A number of very different structures can result in limiting or "freezing" the amount
of taxable future appreciation in an estate. One writer identified at least 12 different value
capping or freeze methods. See Abbin, The Value-Capping Cafeteria - Selecting the Appropri-
ate Freeze Technique, 15 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 2000 (1981).
87. Based on the author's survey, the number of published articles in the area which
expressly mention estate freezing in their titles well exceeds 150. That number does not in-
clude other numerous articles on general estate planning which would direct some attention to
estate valuation freezes. See infra notes 88, 89, and 96-104, for citations to some of the
literature.
88. As discussed in the text which follows, the goal of the estate valuation freeze is to
place a ceiling on the estate tax value of property, shifting future appreciation to other individ-
uals, typically the natural objects of the taxpayer's bounty. From 1967-1987, the Consumer
Price Index increased from 33.4 to 113.6, for all items, and the cost of shelter, for example,
increased from 28.8 to 121.3. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MONTHLY LABOR
REVIEW AND HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS PERIODIC, reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
No. 758 (109th ed. 1989). The estate valuation freeze concept assumes that the underlying
assets will significantly appreciate over the long term. See Burch & Hemmerling, Estate Plan-
ning in an Inflation Economy, 27 S. CAL. TAX INST. 489 (1975); Abbin & Harrill, Using Tax
Strategies To Fight Inflacession, 58. TAXES 839 (1980); butsee Harl, Estate Planning in an Era
of Declining Asset Values, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 637 (1984/85).
89. See, e.g., Abbin, Gift, Estate, and Income Tax Exposure from Recapitalizing Closely
Held Companies, 10 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1200 (1976); Abbin, The Partnership Capital
Freeze - An Alternative to Corporate Recapitalization, 13 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1800 (1979);
Wallace, An Overview of Estate Freezing Techniques and Attendant Estate and Gift Tax
Problems, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 71 (1980); Cohan, Outline on Recapitalizations and
Holding Companies, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 81 (1980); Nelson, The Partnership Capi-
tal Freeze: A Pr)cis, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 99 (1980); Meyers, Outline on Valuation
Problems in Estate Freezing Techniques, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 112 (1980); Kopple,
Corporate Recapitalizations and Partnership Freezes, 17 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1100 (1983);
Petrie, Partnership Freezes. Determining When and How This Estate Planning Technique
Should Be Used, 14 TAX'N LAW. 50 (1985); Wallace, Recapitalizing the Closely Held Corpora-
tion: New Problems for an Old Technique, 19 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 400 (1985); Abbin &
Zukin, Have They Nuked the Freeze? Evaluating the Impact of Recent Decisions, Regulations
and Rulings, 19 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 500 (1985); Elias, The Partnership Capital Freeze: A
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note of caution, arguing that the estate valuation freeze techniques had
the potential of diminishing the role of the estate tax to that of a "volun-
tary tax," 90 paid only by taxpayers who, for whatever reasons, chose not
to avoid the levy.9'
B. The Estate Valuation Freeze Concept
The estate tax is computed with reference to the value of a dece-
dent's taxable estate upon death. 92 The estate tax can therefore be de-
creased with reductions in the value of property included in the taxable
estate of the decedent. One could reduce or eliminate the estate subject
to taxation through contributions to charity,93 extensive lifetime gifts,
94
Path Through the Maze, 40 TAX LAW. 45 (1986); Trebby, Handling Estate Planning Problems
of Valuation of Closely Held Corporations, 14 TAX'N LAw. 220 (1986).
90. See Cooper, supra note 12; Covey, Surrey, & Westfall, Perspectives on Suggested Revi-
sions in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: Symposium, 112 TR. & EST. 102 (1973).
91. Professor Cooper discovered a number of reasons for the failure to use all available
tax avoidance techniques, including non-tax considerations such as inability to part with prop-
erty or a lack of suitable recipients, difficulty of universal application of certain techniques,
particularly to smaller estates, and estate planner expertise, style, and custom. See Cooper,
supra note 12, at 164-70.
92. I.R.C. § 2001(a) (Supp. V 1987). All references herein are to I.R.C. are references to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless otherwise expressly noted.
93. As Mr. Carnegie stated:
This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of wealth: To set an example of
modest, unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance; to provide moder-
ately for the legitimate wants of those dependent upon him; and, after doing so, to
consider all surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust funds, which he is
called upon to administer, and strictly bound as a matter of duty to administer in the
manner which, in his judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial
results for the community ....
A. Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS
14, 25 (1962). A person who is charitably inclined is not required to dispose of the charitable
contribution property during his or her lifetime; the estate tax savings can be realized by a
testamentary charitable transfer, provided that the requirements of I.R.C. § 2055 are satisfied.
Moreover, provisions can be made for both the financial needs of loved ones and the charitable
donation. See infra note 104.
94. The lifetime gifts could be subject to the gift tax, see I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524, which was
enacted as a backstop to the estate tax. See, e.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
39, 44 (1939). The gift tax also had the purpose of restricting income tax avoidance through
the unfettered intrafamily gifting of income-producing property. See R. PAUL, supra note 25,
at 959-64. Lifetime gifts enjoy, however, certain wealth transfer tax advantages when com-
pared with testamentary transfers. The principal benefit of an outright gift is that if the gift is
complete for estate tax purposes, without inclusionary retained powers or interests, all future
appreciation inures to the donee. Except for I.R.C. § 2035(c), which includes in the taxable
estate all gift taxes paid for transfers within three years of death, any gift tax paid on a gift is
not included in the donor's estate. Lifetime gifts are eligible for the annual donee gift exclusion
of $10,000 (see I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982)), which can effectively be increased to $20,000 in the
case of a married couple electing gift-splitting under I.R.C. § 2513. On the other hand, the
donee loses the benefit of the date of death value income tax basis for property received by
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an extravagant lifestyle, or other wealth dissipation activities. In the
view of its critics, the estate valuation freeze permitted an individual to
reduce his or her taxable estate without meaningfully parting with the
property's lifetime benefits.
95
The typical estate valuation freeze techniques shared a common as-
sumption that property can be divided into a number of separate interests
for wealth transfer taxation purposes, the result being a transfer of the
appreciation elements to the younger generation, and retention of those
interests that would not appreciate by the elder generation. 96 The corpo-
rate recapitalization was probably the most widely discussed valuation
freeze technique.
In the typical case, the equity interests in a closely held corporation
were recapitalized to create a common stock class, which would partici-
pate in all future appreciation, and a preferred stock class, which had
senior rights to current income and liquidation proceeds, but limited ap-
bequest, devise, or inheritance provided by I.R.C. § 1014 and receives only a modified substi-
tuted basis under I.R.C. § 1015. The donor, by paying a lifetime gift tax, loses the benefit of
deferring the payment of wealth transfer taxes until death. Even in the environment prior to
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, in which the gift tax rates for gifts were lower than those for the
estate tax, a number of countervailing factors, often of a nontax nature, led to surprisingly little
lifetime gifting. For a discussion of these factors, see C. SHOUP, supra note 52, at 21-25.
95. See Dunn, Enjoy Property Now and Avoid Estate Taxes Later, 72 A.B.A. J. 66 (Jan.
1986). I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038 were enacted to preclude cruder versions of such activities, such as
the retention of a life estate, or the retention of an income interest by a trust settlor. However,
these provisions were not generally effective against the common estate valuation freeze struc-
tures. The last straw for the Treasury was supplied by Judge Korner's decision in Estate of
Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987), in which application of I.R.C. § 2036
was rejected, at least under the facts of the case, in the context of a dual class stock structure.
On the other hand, the viability of some techniques, such as the sale of a remainder interest,
was called into question by judicial developments. Gradow v. United States, I I Cl. Ct. 808
(1987) (applying the estate depletion concept of United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.
1961)). See, e.g., Note, Gradow v. United States: Death of Remainder Interest Sale as an
Estate Freezing Technique?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 183 (1988).
96. An asset value freeze is based on the concept that property can be fractionalized into
different bundles of rights, each of which has a value that can be determined and made the
object of a transfer within a family group. The corporate and partnership structures, through
the use of differing classes of stock and partnership interests, readily lend themselves to divid-
ing a single business enterprise or property interest into a number of separate proprietary inter-
ests. Division into separate interests can be achieved in a nonentity context through the
creation of a life estate in the elder generation member, whether by a sale of the remainder or
through a joint acquisition of separate interests. In addition to the articles listed supra note 89,
the following publications address the separation of enterprise interests. Ehrlich, Corporate
Recapitalization as an Estate Planning Business Retention Tool, 34 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1661
(1976); Borini, The Personal Holding Company as an Estate Planning Tool, 26 S. CAL. TAX
INST. 143 (1974); Dean, The Family Business: Organization and Reorganization, 5 INST. ON
EST. PLAN. 300 (1971); Nash, Family Partnerships. A Viable Planning Alternative, 13 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. 1000 (1979); Scheifly, Partnership Recapitalization: Achieving a Capital
Freeze, 32 S. CAL. TAX INST. 500 (1980).
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preciation. A relatively nominal value was usually claimed for the com-
mon stock when it was subsequently sold or gifted to the younger
generation, while the older generation retained the senior preferred
stock.
97
Other techniques shared the estate valuation freeze rubric with the
corporate recapitalization. 98 Installment sales of property to family
members, 99 sales of remainder interests,10° and private annuities' 0 1 could
also be used to shift future appreciation to others, though, at some in-
come tax cost to the transferor. On the other hand, business buy-sell
97. The following example demonstrates the significant tax avoidance potential presented
by the recapitalization of a successful family business:
The stock of Computer Corp. is owned solely by Parent. An estimate of the
value of the stock as of year 1 is $5 million. The future prospects for Computer
Corp. are very bright, and Parent wishes to shift the fruits of such success to Parent's
children. Parent causes Computer Corp. to be recapitalized in a taxdeferred reor-
ganization and receives preferred stock and common stock in exchange for the com-
mon shares previously held. It is hoped that due to the dividend, voting, and other
characteristics of the preferred shares, the preferred shares will absorb most of the
current value of Computer Corp., and the common shares will have only a nominal
present value. On the other hand, due to the limited participation rights of the pre-
ferred shares in dividends and liquidation proceeds, it is also hoped that the preferred
stock will not further appreciate in value as the company prospers. Parent immedi-
ately gifts all of the common shares to the children in year 1, retaining only the
preferred shares. If a gift tax is due on the transfer of the common shares, the tax
may not be significant in view of the amount claimed as the value of the common
shares.
Upon Parent's death in year 20, Computer Corp. is worth $200 million. If the
freeze has its intended effect, the $195 million in appreciation in the company is
owned by the children through their stock investment, and Parent's estate includes
only the $5 million value of the preferred shares.
98. A similar effect could be achieved with a multi-class partnership. See Schriebman,
Family Partnership As an Estate Planning Device Must Pass IRS Muster: Some Guidelines, 4
EST. PLAN. 16 (1976); Abbin, The Partnership Capital Freeze - An Alternative to Corporation
Recapitalization, supra note 89; Nelson, The Partnership Capital Freeze: Income, Estate, and
Gift Tax Considerations, 1 VA. TAX REV. 11 (1981).
99. See, e.g., Cornfeld, Installment Sales: Are They Rushing or Slowing Down?, 15 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. 1100 (1981); Note, The Safe-Harbor Interest Rates Under Section 483 of the
Internal Revenue Code: A Gift Tax Trap, 20 IND. L. REV. 679 (1987); Moore, Analyzing the
Complex New Proposed Regs on Imputed Interest and Original Issue Discount, 65 J. TAX'N 14
(1986); Banoff & Hartz, Self-Cancelling Installment Notes. New IRS Rulings Expand Opportu-
nities, 65 J. TAX'N 146 (1986).
100. See, e.g., Weinbaum, Are Sales of Remainder Interests Still Available in Light of a
New Decision?, 14 EST. PLAN. 258 (1987).
101. See generally Sackett, Using Private Annuities Today. The Benefits, the Drawbacks
and Open Questions, 49 J. TAX'N 48 (1978); Bilansky, Making the Most of Private Annuity
Arrangements to Transfer Property and Reduce Estate Tax, 8 EST. PLAN. 102 (1981); Hartz &
Banofl Planning Opportunities Available Using a Private Annuity for a Term of Years, 65 J.
TAX'N 302 (1986).
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agreements, 10 2 split interest purchases, 103 and the "grantor retained in-
come trust,"'04 presented wealth transfer tax avoidance avenues that did
not carry as detrimental income tax consequences. 10 5 If respected for
valuation purposes, the estate freeze offered tantalizing wealth transfer
tax avoidance benefits.
0 6
102. See Dickey, Buy-Sell Agreements Can Conclusively Limit Value Without Recapitaliza-
tion Problems, 11 EST. PLAN. 268 (1984); but see Treanor, Is the Eighth Circuit's St. Louis
Bank Case the Death Knell for Restrictive Stock Agreements?, 57 J. TAX'N 200 (1982). See also
Tobisman, Estate and Gift Tax Considerations in Buy-Sell Agreements, 35 S. CAL. TAX INST.
1700 (1983); Bucholtz, Using Restrictive Sales Agreements to Fix a Low Estate Tax Value for a
Business Interest, 8 EST. PLAN. 146 (1981).
103. See Moore, The Use of Life Estates and Remainder Interests in Estate Planning, 19
INST. ONl EST. PLAN. 1200 (1985); Adams, Bieber & Johnson, Joint Purchases of Life Estates
and Remainder Interests, 124 TR. & EST. 32 (1985); Adams, Value-Shifting Techniques -
Bang or Bust?, 20 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1300 (1986); Trebby, Current Approaches to Shifting
Value Through Sales and Purchases of Remainder Interests, 13 EST. PLAN. 362 (1986).
104. See Kelly,.IRS Expands Definition of Gift to Launch New Attack on Two Estate Freez-
ing Techniques, 15 EST. PLAN. 230 (1988); Zabel, The Best (Last?) Game in Town, 127 TR. &
EST. 25 (Jan. 1988); Adams, supra note 103. Another technique that can be used to shift
appreciation is the split interest charitable trust, in which the deduction for the charitable
beneficiary's interest shelters the value of the property placed in trust for the ultimate benefit of
a private beneficiary. See Abbin & Gormanous, Creative Charitable Giving, 51 TAXES 813
(1973); McCue & Gary, Split-Interest Charitable Giving - Down But Not Out, 20 INST. ON
EST. PLAN. 800 (1986).
105. The income tax (as opposed to the estate or gift tax) implications of the structures
could .be used to separate the techniques into two groups: those resulting in income recogni-
tion in their implementation and those resulting in an effective estate freeze free of immediate
income tax consequences. The distinction could be a significant factor influencing a taxpayer's
choice of the appropriate freeze structure.
In most cases in my own practice the typical estate freezing client is wealthy
.... Suddenly this wealthy client becomes aware that the transfer tax cost of passing
his accumulated wealth to the next generation has become quite high, and that as his
assets continue to increase, that cost will go higher. In addition, while this wealthy
client is now willing to consider passing some of the future appreciation attributable
to his wealth to younger generation family members, he is always inclined to keep, or
insists upon keeping, control over his estate assets, if not forever, at least for the
moment until the donees demonstrate that they are able to handle property satisfac-
torily. Finally, this typical wealthy client hates to pay taxes-in other words, he is a
proponent of the 'I didn't get rich by paying taxes' syndrome. If the client is a busi-
ness owner, he wants his business to be restructured without income tax liability, he
wants to effect lifetime transfers without gift tax liability, and he wants to lower his
estate tax liability as much as possible.
J. Wallace, remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law of the American Bar Association, in Dallas, Texas (Aug. 14, 1979), reprinted in 15 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 19, 22 (1980) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
106. Estates in excess of $3 million face wealth transfer taxes at a marginal rate of 55%,
and estates in excess of $10 million are subject to an overall rate (as opposed to a marginal
rate) of 55%. The Revenue Act of 1987, supra note 13, at § 10401, postponed until 1993 the
phase-in of the 50% maximum rate provided for in I.R.C. § 2001(c). It also amended I.R.C.
§ 2001(c) to provide for a 5% surcharge on the amount of taxable estates in excess of
$10,000,000 but not to exceed $21,040,000 ($18,340,000 in the case of decedents dying, and
Fall 1989] CONGRESSIONAL DIVERSIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
C. Early Treasury and Congressional Responses
The first assaults on the estate valuation freeze techniques were
waged by the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") against relatively sim-
ple plans, and focused primarily on issues of valuation. 10 7 Although the
Service continued to battle taxpayers with mixed success, several of its
published rulings helped facilitate the income tax certainty, and to some
extent the estate and gift tax certainty, of the most widely used struc-
tures.'0 8 The attitude of the Service toward the estate valuation freeze
hardened noticeably with the increasing notoriety of the techniques, as
evidenced by a series of progressively restrictive administrative pro-
nouncements. 10 9 Congress also indirectly contributed to existing uncer-
gifts made, after 1992). The surcharge has the effect of progressively eliminating the benefit of
the graduated tax rates and the unified credit (see I.R.C. § 2010 (Supp. V 1987)) for estates in
excess of $10,000,000, with the benefits being totally eliminated for estates in excess of
$21,040,000 and $18,340,000, respectively. The relatively steep wealth transfer taxation rates
could produce high stakes in controversies with the taxing authorities. For example, in Estate
of Harrison, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987), involving a form of freeze limited partnership, the
asserted estate tax deficiency was $31,758,893.37.
On the other hand, escaping inclusion in the taxable estate carries with it loss of the
I.R.C. § 1014 basis adjustment. The loss of an upward basis adjustment under this section for
income tax purposes must be reconciled with the perceived estate tax savings. However, com-
paring the overall 55% estate tax rate on large estates with the 28% marginal income tax rate
on high income taxpayers introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the loss of the I.R.C.
§ 1014 adjustment might not be as significant a drawback.
107. Compare Estate of Salsbury, supra note 85 (Tax Court disregarded the Service's argu-
ment that the value of the retained voting control was essentially equal to most of the corpo-
rate value); Wallace v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 904 (D. Mass. 1981) (Court discounted the
value of the preferred stock due to the practical unlikelihood that a conversion feature would
be exercised); and Provident Nat'l Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1978) (Court
ruled that the value of preferred stock depended on the risk of default on dividends, the arrear-
age provisions, and the relationship of the dividend rate to other market interest rates. Neither
the common stock value nor the par value of the preferred stock would automatically be deter-
minative of the preferred stock value).
108. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, as modified, Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2
C.B. 370, amplified, Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319, and Rev. Rul. 80-213, 1980-2 C.B.
102, all of which address valuation of preferred and common stock; Rev. Rul. 75-93, 1975-1
C.B. 101, and Rev. Rul. 75-179, 1975-1 C.B. 103, discussing application of I.R.C. § 305; Rev.
Rul. 75-236, 1975-1 C.B. 106, Rev. Rul. 75-222, 1975-1 C.B. 105, and Rev. Rul. 75-247, 1975-
1 C.B. 104, which discuss the applicability of I.R.C. § 306.
109. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 88-3, 1988-1 C.B. 579, in which the IRS continued the practice
begun with Rev. Proc. 83-22, 1983-1 C.B. 680, of denying letter ruling requests for a determi-
nation of whether a transaction constitutes a tax-free corporate recapitalization unless it is an
integral part of a larger transaction for which it was impossible to determine the tax conse-
quences without a determination with regard to the recapitalization. One commentator sug-
gested that this action was not the result of a change of position by the IRS, but was prompted
"because too many requests were being received and presumably not because of any change in
the IRS's view of the applicable law." Elias, Preferred Stock Recapitalizations: Income, Estate
and Gift Tax Issues, 13 J. CORP. TAX'N 332, 334 (1987). See also Rev. Rul. 83-119, 1983-2
C.B. 57, addressing the effects of an excess redemption price for preferred stock issued in a
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tainty by enacting additional penalties aimed at the undervaluation of
property for estate and gift tax purposes, the "Achilles heel" of the com-
mon freeze arrangements. 10
The estate valuation freeze had never been a planning tool for the
faint-hearted. The increased risks, while reducing somewhat its attrac-
tiveness, only partially dimmed the professed zeal of its proponents."'
This optimism was buoyed by favorable developments in the United
corporate recapitalization, and Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170, discussing the factors deter-
mined by the Service to be significant in deriving the fair market value of preferred and com-
mon stock received in certain corporate reorganizations. In a series of private letter rulings,
the IRS asserted that the retained power provisions of I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038 apply to asset
freeze techniques. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-04-011 (Oct. 1, 1984), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-10-002
(Nov. 26, 1984), and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-10-011 (Nov. 15, 1985).
110. Congress added I.R.C. § 6660 as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). This section provides for a valuation penalty for estate and
gift tax returns where there is a valuation understatement. Proper valuation is a concern.
No matter how you dress up the preferred stock with ornaments, you just can't
get virtually 100 percent of the value of the company into the preferred stock...
[T]here is just no way that a valuation expert can substantiate a conclusion that the
value of the preferred stock is equal to 100 percent of the value of the company ....
People say to me in situations like I have described that with all the preferred stock
outstanding the common stock can't possibly be worth anything at all. To which I
reply, then why would anybody want it. To which they reply, because it has appreci-
ation possibilities. To which I reply, then it has a very big value. How can the
common stock be without significant value if the outlook for the company is so bright
that we need a preferred stock recapitalization to freeze value in the first place?
Panel Discussion, supra note 105, at 54-55.
111. The revenue pronouncements cited in note 109 were generally considered as compli-
cating the area of corporate recapitalization freezes, but by no means eliminating the potential
for estate tax avoidance. See, e.g., Friedman, New Ruling Requires Creative Planning in Struc-
turing Recapitalizations, 60 J. TAX'N 146 (1984); Fowler, Planning for Recapitalizations in
Light of Recent Administrative and Legislative Developments, 63 TAXES 202 (1985). Although
the IRS attacked the asset freeze on various fronts, it appeared that until the recent enactment
of I.R.C. § 2036(c), discussed below, the widely used corporate freeze was a legitimate tax
deferral device. In Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, supra note 95, the IRS's retained power
theories were rejected by the United States Tax Court. The remainder sale technique, how-
ever, was called into question by judicial developments. See supra note 95. Another uncer-
tainty was presented by the IRS's position when it asserted that the holder of the preferred
stock in a family corporation freeze made an indirect gift through foregoing his or her pre-
ferred stock dividends. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-23-007 (Feb. 18, 1987). The IRS has also held that a
preferred shareholder's nonexercise of conversion rights (which are typically included to help
support the value absorbing quality of the preferred stock) resulted in a gift to the common
shareholders. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-26-005 (Mar. 13, 1987). Although the IRS won its legislative
victory, it may still continue to press its gift tax theories against past and future estate freeze
structures. See Kelly, supra note 104. For further discussion, see Abbin, Taking the Tempera-
ture of Asset Value Freeze Approaches: What's Hot, What's Not, 66 TAXES 3 (1988). However,
new I.R.C. § 2036(c) itself should not apply to existing freeze structures and the nonexercise of
such existing rights, due to special effective date provisions. See infra note 142.
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States Tax Court. There, the Service suffered a significant defeat in Es-
tate of Boykin, 12 setting the stage for a response from Congress.
D. Congressional Actions
In his 1977 article, Professor George Cooper" 13 proposed that Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 2036 be amended to expressly address the cor-
porate recapitalization and multi-class partnership capital freeze. Some
experts in the area of estate valuation freezes predicted fallout from his
suggestions." 4 However, Professor Cooper's comments did not publicly
surface at the legislative level for a number of years.
The Treasury's proposals for estate and gift tax reform, included in
its 1984 report," 15 suggested limiting the allowance of minority or frac-
tional-share discounts in valuing property interests, but did not otherwise
propose restrictions on the estate valuation freeze."l
6
The President's tax proposal to the Congress 17 included no provi-
sions for estate and gift tax reform when unveiled in 198'5. At the Treas-
ury's request, the.American Bar. Association appointed a special task
force, under the direction of the Section of Taxation, to study how the
wealth transfer tax system should be reformed." 8 The American Bar
Association study suggested that the estate valuation freeze could be lim-
ited through the' promulgation of additional regulations." 19
112. See supra note 95.
113. See Cooper, supra note 12.
114. A typical response was, "So if you want a road map of where the Treasury and the
Internal Revenue Service are going to seek legislative relief over the next ten years, just read
this article, because, believe you me, people in the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service
have read it." Panel Discussion, supra note 105, at 32.
115. Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury Depart-
ment Report (Nov, 1984) [hereinafter Treasury Report].
116. The Treasury report pr9posed that no minority discount be permitted for gift or es-
tate valuation purposes. Treasury Report, supra note 115, at 386-88. Instead, the value of the
minority interest would be determined as the minority interest's pro rata share of the fair
market value of the entire interest held by the donor. Id. This approach, which applied family
attribution principles to aggregate property interests held by related parties, was significant
because it represented a departure from the prevailing application of standard business valua-
tion concepts. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-60, supra note 108. However, statutory precedent did
exist for valuing certain property for federal estate tax purposes at other than its highest value.
See I.R.C. § 2032A, which permits a reduction in fair market value for real property used in
farming and other closely held businesses.
117. The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity,
21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (May 29, 1985) [hereinafter President's Proposals].
118. See ABA PROPOSALS, supra note 9.
119. The ABA noted that, "These are also areas that might be addressed in regulations
that would discourage the use of such arrangements for what are, essentially substitutes for
testamentary disposition. This does not mean that.such arrangements should not be permitted
where they conform to economic reality." Id. at 424.
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The estate valuation freeze limitations finally arrived on the legisla-
tive scene in 1987, and not surprisingly, as a companion to minority dis-
count valuation limitations. The staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, together with the staff of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, targeted estate freezes for reform, asserting that in the corporate re-
capitalization, the elder generation member effectively retains a life
interest in the corporation by retaining voting preferred stock.120 Estate
valuation freezes were not addressed by the Joint Committee on Taxation
in a subsequent proposal. ' 2' However, limitations on them resurfaced in
a paper prepared several weeks before House deliberations on pending
tax legislation.
22
The House of Representatives passed the Revenue Bill of 1987 on
October 29, 1987 as part of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.123
The legislation addressed both minority discounts and estate valuation
freezes in new Internal Revenue Code section 2211, captioned "Special
Valuation Rules."' 124 The House proposal drew immediate fire from the
practicing bar.125 The Senate bill omitted both provisions. 126 In the
120. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Ways and Means Committee
focused on reforms with respect to preferred stock valuation freezes, intra-family grants of
long-term purchase options, use of fractional share as opposed to specified dollar amount for-
mulae for marital deduction trusts (which would reject the result in Estate of Alexander v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 34 (1984), aff'd without opinion, 760 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1985)), and
minority discounts. The minority discount provisions differed from those in Treasury Report,
supra note 115, in that two alternatives were proposed. A proportionate share approach simi-
lar to that proposed in Treasury Report was included, but as an alternative the paper proposed
a family attribution approach that would aggregate other interests in the property owned by
related individuals. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N AND COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES
PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS (Comm. Print 1987), pp. 265-67,
[hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS].
121. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., DESCRIPTION OF
ADMINISTRATION REVENUE PROPOSALS, EXPIRING TAX PROVISIONS, ESTATE TAX DEDUC-
TION FOR ESOP'S, AND ESTIMATED TAX PROPOSAL (Sept. 30, 1987) [hereinafter DESCRIP-
TION OF REVENUE PROPOSALS].
122. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., DESCRIPTION OF
ADDITIONAL TAX PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS FOR WAYS AND MEANS COMMIT-
TEE REVENUE RECONCILIATION CONSIDERATION (Oct. 13, 1987) [hereinafter DESCRIPTION
OF ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS].
123. H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H9185 (1987).
124. Section 10108 of the bill proposed a new I.R.C. § 2211. Id. at 133 CONG. REC.
H9332. I.R.C. § 221 l(a) addressed minority discounts, adopting the proportionate valuation
approach of the Treasury Report proposal, with an additional fallback provision utilizing fam-
ily attribution rules. The new section 2211(b) addressed valuation freezes.
125. Members of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar
Association delivered a letter, dated November 9, 1987, to Senator Lloyd Bentsen. The com-
ments considered the minority discount provisions as discriminatory, favoring "ownership in
large corporations over ownership in closely held business." Id. at 6. Letter signed by Lloyd
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Conference Committee the minority discount limitations were discarded,
and the special valuation approach was eliminated. Following Professor
Cooper's suggestion of a decade before, the provision was recast into the
familiar retained power or interest form of Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 2036 that had been a long-standing feature of the wealth transfer tax
provisions, 127 and one of the bases for the Treasury's unsuccessful judi-
cial tests of freeze arrangements. 128 The provisions emerged from the
Conference Committee to become section 10402 of the Revenue Act of
1987,129 part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987,130
which was signed into law by President Reagan on December 22, 1987.
After some conflicting reports, the estimated revenue impact of the pro-
visions addressing estate tax freezes was projected to be approximately
$109 million by the year 1990.131
Leva Plaine and other members of the American Bar Association Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law Section to Honorable Lloyd Bentsen (Nov. 9, 1987). The letter in part stated: "In
summary, the proposed section is unnecessary, vague, lacks content and is overbroad. It
should not be enacted." Id. at 9.
126. S. 1920, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
127. The legislation incorporated valuation freezes as a part of I.R.C. § 2036, treating the
transfer of property in connection with a freeze as a retention of enjoyment of the transferred
property within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
128. See supra note 95.
129. Revenue Act of 1987, supra note 13.
130. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, supra note 13. The Revenue Act of
1987, supra note 13, § 10402, enacted new I.R.C. § 2036(c), which addresses estate valuation
freeze transactions (former I.R.C. § 2036(c) was redesignated as I.R.C. § 2036(d) (Supp. V
1987)).
131. The estimated revenue impact of the estate valuation freeze amendments was initially
projected as $1.4 billion additional revenues by the year 1990. See DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE
OPTIONS, supra note 120, at 267. The estimated revenue impact of the new freeze legislation,
as reported in the final Revenue Act of 1987, for years 1988-1990, was scaled back to $109
million. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 499, 1025, reprinted in 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-1245, 2313-1771 [hereinafter 1987 CONFERENCE
REPORT]. According to the Senate Report for its version of TAMRA, the revenue effect of the
TAMRA freeze amendments would result in less than a $500,000 revenue loss in 1989 and
1990, and a $1 million revenue loss in 1991. S. REP. No. 445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 523, 543,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4515 [hereinafter 1988 SENATE RE-
PORT]. In the House Report, the freeze provisions were included with a lump-sum "Technical
Corrections" revenue amount and a separate number was not provided. However, all of the
technical corrections yielded only $28 million in years 1988-91. H.R. REP. No. 795, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 424, 628 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 HOUSE REPORT]. The Conference Report
did not provide any separate revenue amounts for the freeze provisions. Because the legisla-
tion does not apply to existing freeze structures (see infra note 142), the revenue effect may not
be significant for some time. Based on reported comments made by Treasury Tax Legislative
Counsel Dana L. Trier in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on May 17, 1989,
the revenue yield of the statute could be $555 million in 1995. Louden, Treasury Rejects Pro-
posals to Retroactively Repeal Estate Freeze Limits, 43 TAX NOTES 926 (1989). Messrs. Brad-
ley and Gephardt coined the phrase "cats and dogs" in describing "semiannual ... tax reform
bills that chip away at the deficit by picking up small increments of revenue." Bradley &
The freeze limitations had been produced in a relatively short time
in the House of Representatives. The Senate proposal omitted them alto-
gether, resulting in no refinement of the wording or concepts at that
level. In Conference Committee, however, the final statute was ham-
mered out, using an altogether different tack than the one proposed in
the original House bill. The Reagan Administration reportedly did not
like the legislation, and the Treasury opposed the measure in the House
of Representatives and again in the Senate. 132 This process ultimately
produced legislation that was roundly criticized by many as vague and
poorly conceived.
133
Congressional haste was followed by technical corrections. Amend-
ments to the Revenue Act of 1987 estate freeze limitations were inserted
in the version of the Technical Corrections Act of 1988,134 introduced in
both the House and the Senate on March 31, 1988. On July 26, 1988, the
House Ways and Means Committee reported its version of the bill,
renamed the Miscellaneous Revenue Bill of 1988, which proposed com-
prehensive amendments. Between the March 31, 1988 introduction date
and the July 26, 1988 report date, the legislation grew more complex and
exemptions multiplied. The reported bill included the earlier technical
Gephardt, Fixing the Income Tax with the Fair Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 41, 43 (1984).
The Revenue Act of 1987 might share that characterization.
132. The position of the Administration and Treasury was noted in comments by Frederic
Grundeman, attorney with the Internal Revenue Service Passthrough and Special Industries
Division, before the District of Columbia Bar Section of Taxation, at a luncheon on March 7,
1989. See Louden, Forthcoming Estate Freeze Guidance Explained, 42 TAx NOTES 1297
(1989). Mr. Grundeman is the principal author of a recent administrative notice concerning
application of § 2036(c). See infra note 141.
133. See, e.g., Mahon, Poorly Conceived Statute is Bad for Business, 127 TR. & EST. 45, 50
(May 1988) ("New Sec. 2036(c) has many faults. Considered by itself as a piece of legislation,
it contains ill-defined terms and concepts, which leave one wondering about its exact scope...
In short, New Sec. 2036(c) is a poorly conceived statute which furthers no social policy other
than anti-competitiveness. Repeal should be immediate."); Rapkin, New Code Section Creates
Pitfalls for Planners, 127 TR. & EST. 31, 38 (1988) ("Sec. 2036(c) may have eliminated many of
the estate freezing techniques widely employed in the past, but not all ... Sec. 2036(c) fails at
its attempted purpose. However, tax advisors must be alert to the pitfalls created by Sec.
2036(c)."); Bettigole, Use of Estate Freeze Severely Restricted by Revenue Act of '87, 68 J.
TAX'N 132, 134 (1988) ("Living with Section 2036(c) will be particularly difficult because the
section is worded so broadly . . . . Accordingly, it is impossible at this time to state with
certainty which freeze techniques are within or outside the scope of the section. Preliminarily,
however, based upon a fair reading of the legislation it appears that clients can still benefit
from a number of planning techniques that should remain viable.").
134. H.R. 4333 and S. 2238, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 CONG. REC. § 3545 (1988). The
proposed amendments were relatively simple, and addressed deemed gifts arising upon subse-
quent transfers of interests in the frozen enterprise and enhanced regulation writing authority
for the Secretary of the Treasury. The provisions gave rise to a new controversy as to whether
the subsequent transfer provisions extended to the automatic lapse, for example, of a limited
life preferred stock interest. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
Fall 1989] CONGRESSIONAL DIVERSIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
corrections, but also added several safe harbor provisions for certain re-
tained interests, and a right of recovery of estate taxes against transfer-
ees. 135 On August 4, 1988, the House passed the bill. On August 3,
1988, the Senate Finance Committee reported an amended version of the
Technical Corrections Act of 1988 which incorporated many of the
House additions.1 36 On October 11, 1988, the Senate passed the House
bill as further amended in the Senate. The conference version of the two
bills took form in the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988,137 passed by both houses on October 21, 1988, and was signed into
law by President Reagan on November 10, 1988.
The journey of the estate freeze limitations from relative obscurity,
to enactment, and then to comprehensive amendment, took almost one
year. The process had followed the familiar pattern; answer a notorious
abuse with complex and sweeping legislation, and then, in response to
public criticism of the measure, amend the statute to the point of relative
ineffectiveness. The journey is probably not over. The American Bar
Association has called for the statute's repeal, and repeal legislation has
in fact, been introduced in Congress. 138 The effectiveness of the legisla-
tion is discussed in the pages that follow.
III. Reviewing the Legislative Response
A. Introduction
It should not be surprising that a statute, which was both enacted
and substantially amended in less than twelve months, would be criti-
135. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 131.
136. S. REP. No. 445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter 1988 SENATE BILL]. The
Senate bill differed from the House bill most significantly in its failure to amend the language
of I.R.C. § 2036(c)(l)(B) requiring retention of a "disproportionately large share in the income
of, or rights in, the enterprise." The House bill proposed a much broader test. See infra notes
185-88 and accompanying text.
137. TAMRA, supra note 14.
138. The American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
reportedly engaged in a letter-writing campaign urging repeal of the statute. See Louden, ABA
Real Property Section Takes Aim at Section 2036(c), 41 TAX NOTES 897 (1988). The Ameri-
can Bar Association's Section of Taxation, the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law and the American College of Probate Counsel submitted a report recommending repeal,
substituting a valuation provision specifically addressing the valuation 'problems of estate
freezes. See Section 2036(c) Should Be Repealed, Say ABA Section Members, 44 TAX NOTES
855 (1989). Rep. Bill Archer received the 1989 Congressional Award from the Small Business
Council of America for his efforts to repeal I.R.C. § 2036(c) through introducing H.R. 60,
along with 58 co-sponsois. See Archer Honored for Fight to Repeal 'Estate Freeze', 43 TAX
NOTES 1293 (1989). Congressman Archer's bill was not alone. As of the May 17, 1989 testi-
mony by Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel, Dana L. Trier, before the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, there were three Senate bills providing for retroactive repeal. See Louden, supra note 131.
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cized as technically inconsistent. Conversely, in view of the difficult
challenge in effectively addressing the many estate valuation freeze tech-
niques, it should also not be surprising that any resulting legislation
would be generally complex.13 9 The purpose of the following discussion
is not to dwell upon the technical inadequacies of the legislation or its
operation. 140 Instead, the purpose is to give the reader a sense of the
unfinished chapter that Congress has started in this area, and the con-
fused void that remains to be filled by the Service' 41 and ultimately the
courts. The author hopes that this introduction to the new legislation
and its numerous unanswered questions, exceptions, and technical em-
bellishments will move one to question whether this type of legislation is
a desirable focus of congressional attention.
B. The Operative Provisions
1. The Three Statutory Requirements
If the staute applies, the retention of an interest by a person, typi-
cally an elder generation member, will be considered a retention of the
enjoyment of an interest transferred to another person, typically a
younger generation member, within the context of Internal Revenue
Code section 2036(a). Such a retained interest will result in the inclusion
139. For some of the current literature, see Naples, Despite Recent Changes, Recapitaliza-
tions Can Still "Freeze" ah Estate, 17 TAX'N LAW., 160 (1988); Foster & Rabun, Planning
Strategies to Cope With the Limits Imposed on Estate Freezes by RA '87, 15 EST. PLAN. 130
(1988); Jones, Transfers of Remainders Can Be an Effective Technique, but Careful Planning Is
Required, 16 EST. PLAN. 38 (1989); Spewak & Keller, Treatment of Estate Freezes Revised by
TAMRA but Many Questions Remain, 16 EST. PLAN. 82 (1989).
140. See Aucutt, Estate Freezes After The Revenue Act of 1987, 5 AKRON TAX J. 1 (1988),
for a discussion of the Revenue Act of 1987 version of the statute. See Blattmachr & Gans, An
Analysis of the TAMRA Changes to the Valuation Freeze Rules (Parts I & II), 70 J. TAX'N 14
(1989) and 70 J. TAX'N 74 (1989) for a technical discussion of the.statute after the TAMRA
changes.
141. On August 31, 1989, a short time before this article was sent to press, the IRS issued
Notice 89-99, 1989-38 I.R.B. 4, providing guidance with respect to certain issues. The Notice
states that it serves as an "administrative pronouncement" as described in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6661-3(b)(2) (1985) and may be relied upon in the same manner as a revenue ruling or a
revenue procedure. Provisions of forthcoming regulation' that are inc6nsistent With the No-
tice and generally adverse to taxpayers will be applied prospectively ofily. The Notice reminds
taxpayers that the IRS will entertain requests for private letter rulings on the applicability of
I.R.C. § 2036(c) pursuant to Rev. Proc. 88-50, 1988-2 C.B.,613. As of the time of prepairation
of this article, Rev. Proc. 88-50 was issued on atest basis, due to 'expire on December 31, 1989.
The issuance of Notice 89-99 was long awaited by the estate planning community. By
some reports, it was delayed because of a personnel shuffle within the Treasury Department.
Sheppard, Estate Freezes Continue to Pose Problems, 43 TAX NOTES 517 (1989). Ironically,
even the Notice states that the significant features arid operative elements of the statute "are
neither adequately defined in the statute nor susceptible to generally accepted interpretation."
Id. Overview (B). I . I . I -
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of the transferred interest in the transferor's estate, if three requirements
are satisfied: (1) any person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise;
(2) such person in effect transfers, after December 17, 1987, 142 property
having a disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in
such person's interest in the enterprise; and (3) such person retains an
interest in the income of, or rights in, the enterprise. 43
The three requirements incorporate a number of terms which re-
quire further elaboration.
142. The Conference Committee Report for the Revenue Act of 1987 stated that the stat-
ute does not apply to transfers completed before December 18, 1987. The following example
was given:
Thus, for example, when a person who owns all the common and preferred
stock in an enterprise transfers all the common stock after December 17, 1987, while
retaining the preferred stock, the provision applies, even though the two classes of
stock existed prior to December 18, 1987. If, in that situation, all the common stock
is transferred prior to December 18, 1987, the provision does not apply to the trans-
feror (or his spouse), even if either the common or preferred stock is transferred in
subsequent transactions after December 17, 1987, so long as that transferor or his
spouse does not reacquire any common stock.
1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1743. TAMRA § 3031(h)(4) provides
for a "correction period" in which I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1) shall not apply to a transaction entered
into after December 17, 1987 and ending before January 1, 1990 if "actions are taken as are
necessary to have such section 2036(c)(1) not apply" or "the original transferor and his spouse
on January 1, 1990 (or, if earlier, the date of the original transferor's death), does not hold any
interest in the enterprise involved." TAMRA, § 3031(h)(4), at 3639. This apparently permits
taxpayers to unwind freeze transactions as far as I.R.C. § 2036(c) is concerned, but the other
aspects of the unwinding, for example, gift tax consequences, are not addressed. Notice 89-99,
supra note 141, Part VIII, states that even post-death modifications occurring not later than
December 31, 1989 will be considered as occurring within the correction period. In addition,
the Notice exempts corrective actions from causing inclusion under I.R.C. § 2035(d). The
1988 TAMRA Conference Report also states that "for purposes of the effective date of section
2036(c), with respect to property transferred prior to December 18, 1987, the failure to exer-
cise a right of conversion or the failure to pay dividends, or the failure to exercise other rights
specified in regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, will not be treated as a transfer
under section 2036(c)." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 reprinted in
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS , 5048, 5134 [hereinafter 1988 CONFERENCE RE-
PORT]. The latter provision was inserted in response to concerns raised by the Service's posi-
tion that gifts can occur through the non-exercise of rights created under existing freezes. See
supra note 1l1. The 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT exemption is limited to rights in existence
prior to December 18, 1987, and the IRS's argument could be made for rights created thereaf-
ter or for pre-December 18, 1987 freezes not calling the effective date into question.
143. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1) (amended 1988). The third factor of the statute as originally en-
acted required "retaining a disproportionately large share in the income of, or rights in, the
enterprise." TAMRA § 3031(e) deleted the retention of a "disproportionately large share"
requirement, substituting the much broader test which requires only "retaining an interest."
TAMRA, § 3031(e) at 3637. This change is discussed in more detail infra, notes 185-89 and
accompanying text.
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2. Any Person Holding a Substantial Interest in an Enterprise
a. Attribution of Ownership
The statute applies to the holding and subsequent transfer and re-
tention of certain interests by a "person." This term includes not only
individuals, but trusts, estates, partnerships, associations, companies, or
corporations as well.144 Because the gift tax14 5 and the estate tax146 are
imposed only on individuals, it is necessary to ultimately attribute the
formal ownership of the activities to a human being. The definition of
the term "substantial interest" provides that link. Internal Revenue
Code section 2036(c)(3)(A) states that:
A person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise if such per-
son owns (directly or indirectly) 10 percent or more of the voting
power or income stream, or both, in such enterprise. For purposes of
the preceding sentence, an individual shall be treated as owning any
interest in an enterprise which is owned (directly or indirectly) by any
member of such individual's family.
147
The application of this section may have far-reaching impact. For
example, if a natural person owns stock in the highest tier of a multiple
corporation group, and a recapitalization occurs at one of the operating
subsidiary levels, the Treasury would probably seek to use the "directly
or indirectly" language of the first parenthetical to attribute those freez-
ing activities to the upstream individual shareholder.
48
144. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987), which states: "(a) When used in this title, where
not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof - (1)
Person - The term "person" shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust,
estate, partnership, association, company or corporation."
145. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1982), which states in part: "A tax ... is hereby imposed ... on
the transfer of property by gift ... by any individual, resident or non-resident."
146. I.R.C. § 2001(a) (Supp. V 1987), states: "A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of
the taxable estate of every decedent whose is a citizen or resident of the United States."
147. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
148. The broad "directly or indirectly" language is not new to the Internal Revenue Code.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267, 318, 707(b), and 1239(c) (Supp. V 1987). Under the terms of the
statute, "family" is defined as "such individual's spouse, any lineal descendant of such individ-
ual or of such individual's spouse, any parent or grandparent of such individual, and any
spouse of any of the foregoing." See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1987). The last sentence
of the preceding clause treats legal adoption as a blood relationship. Although siblings are
omitted from the statutory list, they could be included if serial reattribution of ownership
applies. An interest owned by a brother, for example, would be constructively owned by the
parent. The transferor, would in turn own the brother's stock constructively owned by the
parent. The stock of a cousin would be constructively owned by the aunt or uncle as a parent,
then to the grandparents as parents, and then down to the other cousin as the grandchild of a
grandparent. By comparison, I.R.C. § 318 addresses and limits multiple attribution, which
might suggest that Congress did not intend that reattribution apply in this case. See I.R.C.
§ 318(a)(5) (Supp. V 1987). The "spousal unity" rule of I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C) treats an indi-
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The statute does not address entity attribution, except through the
"directly or indirectly" language. Nonetheless, the Conference Commit-
tee Report for the Revenue Act of 1987 does state that interests held
indirectly by a person include "interests held by an entity in which such
person has an interest."' 149 Any details of entity attribution were left for
future regulations.' 50
b. Substantial Interest in an Enterprise
The term "enterprise" is not defined in the statute, but the legisla-
tive history states that, "an enterprise includes a business or other prop-
erty which may produce income or gain."15 1 This language is so broad
as to render moot most disputes as to whether the alternate requirement
of a business exists. 152 The Service has administratively excluded per-
sonal use assets without significant business or investment aspects from
vidual and such individual's spouse as one person. Read literally, this could attribute owner-
ship to a taxpayer of property owned by relatives of the taxpayer's spouse, who would
otherwise not be included under the foregoing definition. For example, such an interpretation
would include the parents or grandparents of the spouse. Part II(B) of Notice 89-99, supra
note 141, states that the definition of family "is defined in section 2036(c)(3)(B), and such
definition is not affected by the spousal unity rule of section 2036(c)(3)(C).
149. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1742.
150. Apparently, the regulations could not adopt the statutorily prescribed entity attribu-
tion approach of I.R.C. § 318, for example, which does not attribute ownership of subsidiary
stock to the individual shareholders of a parent corporation unless the individual shareholder
owns, directly or indirectly, 50% or more of the value of the stock of the parent corporation.
See I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1987). A strict proportional ownership scheme is sug-
gested by the simple statutory language. In that regard, Notice 89-99, supra note 141,. Part
II(B) generally utilizes a proportional rule in determining the extent of indirect ownership.
151. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1742.
152. One commentator has noted that the only property that might not qualify is money,
since in that form it does not produce income or gain. See R. Covey, The New Section 2036(c)
Anti-Estate Freeze Provision (Audiotape, Vol. 1, No. 3, CPE Tax Planning Tapes). A loophole
would exist for some activity which did not rise to the level of a business, and also which did
not constitute "property" or property which may produce income or gain. The latter type of
property, not producing income or gain, may not justify the freeze structure from a practical
standpoint. The other type of activity raises more theoretical issues. Although commercial
goodwill is property, a family name and connections probably don't qualify. See Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973); McCarthy v. United
States, 807 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, certain rights may be so attenuated as to not
qualify as "property" for purposes of wealth transfer taxation. See, e.g., Estate of Barr v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227 (1963), acq. in result, 1964-1 C.B. 4. As an interesting aside, the
TAMRA loan safe harbor provisions for "qualified start-up debt" cannot be utilized by a




the "enterprise" definition. 15 3 Life insurance and personal residences
will generally qualify for the personal use asset exemption. 1
5 4
A "substantial interest" requires ownership of ten percent or more
of the "voting power or income stream, or both," in the enterprise.
155
"Voting power" is not defined in the statute nor in the legislative history,
and many of the corporate voting control issues already encountered in
the corporate taxation area will therefore need to be resolved in the con-
text of the freeze legislation. 1
56
The "income stream" term is similarly undefined and could refer to
gross income, net income, taxable income, cash flow, book income or
some other formulation. Congress provided some guidance in the
TAMRA amendments with the inclusion of certain safe harbors for
153. See Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part I. Notice 89-99, Part I(B), defines an enter-
prise as any arrangement, relationship or activity that has significant business or investment
aspects.
A particular arrangement is classified as an enterprise based on all the facts and
circumstances, including, without limitation, (1) the arrangement's inherent capacity
to produce income or gain, (2) the form of organization(s) through which it is imple-
mented or conducted, (3) the extent to which any property subject to the arrange-
ment was previously held for a business or investment purpose, and (4) the property's
investment potential.
Id.
154. According to the provisions of Notice 89-99:
If the arrangement exclusively involves property that will be used as either the trans-
feror or the transferee's principal residence or a contract that qualifies as life insur-
ance under section 7702 of the Code, the presumption [that significant business or
investment aspects are lacking] is conclusive. If the arrangement involves personal
use property other than such a person residence or a life insurance contract, the
presumption may be rebutted by demonstrating that the arrangement's personal use
aspects are subordinate to its business or investment aspects.
Id. Notice 89-99 limits the personal residence to only that adjacent land not in excess of that
which is reasonably appropriate for residential purposes, taking into account the residence's
size and location. Id. at n.17. With regard to life insurance, Notice 89-99, Example 7, con-
cludes that a life insurance trust is not subject to section 2036(c) despite the presence of an
amount of cash sufficient to produce income approximately equal to the annual premiums on
the policy; this arrangement, however, would run afoul of the grantor trust rules of I.R.C.
§ 677(a)( 3 ) (Supp. V 1987).
155. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1987). Part 11(C) of Notice 89-99, supra note 141,
solicits comments for safe harbors in which a transferor otherwise holding a substantial inter-
est will be exempted if the participation of a significant number of unrelated parties indicates
that the opportunity for such disproportionate transfers does not exist.
156. For example, should the voting power be considered in the aggregate, or class by
class? Compare Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115, which requires a class by class computa-
tion for purposes of meeting the control requirements of I.R.C. § 368(c). How significant or
broad must be the voting rights? See Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 C.B. 218, which holds that the
sole right to participate in the election of directors constitutes voting stock for purposes of
I.R.C. § 1504(a). Voting power has been administratively addressed by the Service in the con-
text of retained rights. See infra note 191.
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loans, the sale or lease of goods and the rendering of services. 57 The
157. TAMRA § 3031(c) added I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7) providing that I.R.C. § 2036(c) shall
not apply to a transaction solely by reason of one or more of:
(a) the receipt (or retention) of "qualified debt"; (b) except as provided in regula-
tions, the existence of an agreement for the sale or lease of goods or other property to
be used in the enterprise or the providing of services and the agreement is an arm's
length agreement for fair market value and the agreement does not otherwise involve
any change in interests in the enterprise; or (c) an option or other agreement to buy
or sell property at the fair market value of such property as of the time the option is
(or the rights under the agreement are) exercised.
TAMRA, at 3636. The exception described in (b) above is further circumscribed by I.R.C.
§ 2036(c)(7)(B), which would deny the safe harbor to services performed under an agreement
for the performance of services over a period greater than three years after the date of transfer
(including any period for which an extension is available at the option of the service provider).
In addition, the exception is unavailable to any amount determined (in whole or in part) by
reference to gross receipts, income, profits or similar items of the enterprise. The term "quali-
fied debt" is defined in I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C), which means any indebtedness if - (i) such
indebtedness unconditionally requires the payment of a sum certain in money in one or more
fixed payments on specified dates and has a fixed maturity date not more than 15 years from
the date of issue (or in the case of indebtedness secured by real property, not more than 30
years from the date of issue), (ii) the' only other amount payable under such indebtedness is
interest determined at a fixed rate or a rate which bears a fixed relationship to a specified
market interest rate, (iii) the interest payment dates are fixed, (iv) such indebtedness is not by
its terms subordinated to the claims of general creditors except where indebtedness is in default
as to interest or principal, (v) such indebtedness does not grant voting rights to the person to
whom the debt is owed or place any limitation on the exercise of voting rights by others and
(vi) such indebtedness is not (directly or indirectly) convertible into an interest in the enter-
prise which would not be qualified debt and does not otherwise grant any right to acquire such
an interest. The requirements in (i) above, requiring fixed payment dates for the repayment of
principal can be excused if the debt is issued in return for cash used to "meet normal business
needs of the enterprise." The interest payment dates required in (iii) would still need to be
observed. Congress created an additional exception for "qualified start-up debt." I.R.C.
§ 2036(c)(7)(D) defines such debt as indebtedness (A) unconditionally requiring the payment
of a sum certain in money; (B) received in exchange for cash to be used in any enterprise
involving the active conduct of a trade or business; (C) the creditor has not at any time (before,
on or after the exchange for cash) transferred any property (including goodwill) which was not
cash to the enterprise or transferred customers or other business opportunities to the enter-
prise; (D) the creditor has not at any time (before, on, or after the exchange for cash) held any
interest in the enterprise (including an interest as an officer, director, or employee) which was
not qualified start-up debt; (E) any person who, would have been considered an original trans-
feree participates in the active management (as defined in § 2032A(e)(12) of the enterprise; and
(F) the indebtedness meets the nonvoting and nonconvertibility restrictions described in (v)
and (vi) above.
Notice 89-99, supra note 141, addressed a number of safe harbor issues. A full discussion
of these issues is beyond the scope of this article. In general, the Notice permits subordination
of qualified debt with selected creditors, although a general subordination would be precluded.
The Notice states that a right to prepay the debt does not adversely affect qualified debt status.
A self-canceling installment note is not qualified debt because it does not unconditionally re-
quire payment of a sum certain in money. With respect to previous transfers of property
disqualifying startup debt, the Notice states that only transfers within three years of the trans-
action will be considered. The Notice also sets forth criteria for a new type of qualified debt
which would be an equity interest in the nature of preferred stock.
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inclusion of safe harbors is commendable in drawing a "bright line."
However, as discussed below, the safe harbors may render the statute
ineffective with respect to the wealthiest taxpayers.
The House technical corrections bill' 58 proposed that the substantial
interest test could be met if the transferor held a substantial interest in
the enterprise either before or after the effective transfer. One example
given in the legislative history was that of a parent transferring cash or
publicly traded stock to a corporation in exchange for preferred stock,
with a child already owning the common stock of the transferee corpora-
tion.15 9 Under the House bill, the section would have applied although
the parent otherwise would not have held an interest in an enterprise
before the transfer.1 60 A second example in the House explanation
targeted the split purchase, in which a parent, purchases an income inter-
est in property and a child purchases a remainder interest in the same
property.16  The explanation stated that the substantial interest test
would be met if, after the purchase, the parent or a member of the par-
ent's family together own ten percent or more of the voting power or
income stream of the property.162 The TAMRA Conference Agreement
deleted the House's "before or after" substantial interest requirement.
The Conference Committee Report instead states that the section is ap-
plicable if a parent transfers an "existing enterprise or assets from such
enterprise to another enterprise in which a child owns a disproportion-
ately large share of potential appreciation and in which the parent retains
an income interest or other rights."'' 63  Although the split purchase
might be excluded, the creation of a holding company to invest in less
than ten percent interests in other enterprises would probably be subject
to the statute.'64 In Notice 89-99165 the Service has taken the contrary
view that the breadth of the statutory language, coupled with the inclu-
sion in TAMRA of limited exceptions, demonstrates the broad sweep of
158. 1988 HouSE REPORT, supra note 136.
159. Id.
160. The cash in the hands of the parent before the transfer was not an "enterprise," and
the interest held in the publicly traded company before the transfer was probably less than ten
percent so as to not be a "substantial interest in an enterprise" as defined in I.R.C.
§ 2036(c)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
161. See supra note 103.
162. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 135, at 424.
163. 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 142, at 5134.
164. The 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT requires only a transfer of an existing enterprise to
another enterprise. Apparently the ten percent substantial interest rule is to be applied only to
the parent's interest in the ultimate holding company, and not to the transferred interest in the
publicly traded company.
165. See supra note 141.
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the statute. The Service considers section 2036(c) as applicable to,
among other arrangements, split purchases of income and remainder
interests. 166
c. Spousal Unity Rule
The statute, as originally enacted, stated that an individual and the
individual's spouse are to be treated as one person. 167 This provision was
aimed at preventing circumvention of the statute through, for example,
gifts of certain interests to a spouse, such that the transfers of the growth
interest would be accomplished by a person different from the person
retaining the limited appreciation interest, or vice versa. One complica-
tion raised by this broad language was that the nontransferor spouse
could be treated as the original transferor of the growth interest, requir-
ing inclusion of the interest in that spouse's estate. The TAMRA amend-
ments sought to address this concern by adding the limiting prefatory
language "except as provided in regulations."' 168 The Conference Agree-
ment states that the regulatory determination of whether spouses are to
be treated as one unit will be generally a function of whether the original
transfer qualified for the marital deduction or annual exclusion. 169 Con-
sequently, with Notice 89-99,17o the Service has limited the application of
the spousal unity rule to interspousal transfers not subject to a transfer
tax.17
166. Example 16 of Part III(C)(3) of Notice 89-99, supra note 141, involves a parent and
child purchase of a portfolio of marketable securities. Parent acquires a life estate and child
acquires the remainder, each furnishing consideration for the fair market value of the interest
acquired. The example concludes that section 2036(c) applies. See infra Part IV for a discus-
sion of the statute's application to selected structures.
167. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1987) stated: "Treatment of Spouse - An individ-
ual and such individual's spouse shall be treated as 1 person."
168. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C) (amended 1988).
169. If the retained interest in the enterprise is transferred to the spouse in a transaction
which qualifies for the marital deduction or annual exclusion, the spouses will generally be
treated as one. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 142, at 5135-36.
170. See supra note 141.
171. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, offers 13 examples of the application of the spousal
unity rule, and a discussion of the rule is beyond the scope of this article. Transfers are consid-
ered subject to a transfer tax if they (a) qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion under section
2503(b), (b) qualify for the federal gift or estate tax marital deduction, or (c) are for full and
adequate consideration. A special rule is provided for interspousal grants of general powers of
appointment. In Part VI(C) of Notice 89-99, the IRS solicited comments as to the advisability
of a regulatory election that would permit a deceased transferor's executor to elect to terminate
the application of the spousal unity rule, with inclusion in the decedent's estate of the property
that would otherwise be includable in the estate of the surviving spouse.
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3. Such Person in Effect Transfers Property Having a
Disproportionately Large Share of the Potential
Appreciation in Such Person's Interest in the
Enterprise
a. In Effect Transfers
In the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1987, the Conference
Committee stated, "[a] transfer encompasses, but is not limited to, all
transactions whereby property is passed to or conferred upon another,
regardless of the means or device employed in its accomplishment."'
172
No further guidance was provided for what constitutes an "in ef-
fect" transfer. Typically, in situations where it is difficult to fashion a
precise statute, Congress has included a specific directive to the Treasury
for prescribing regulations to close loopholes. 173 This simple exercise in
drafting was curiously omitted from the original statute and left for sub-
sequent technical corrections.1 74 Wholesale delegation of authority to
the Treasury is not a complete answer because any regulations, even
those considered "legislative regulations," will be subject to judicial scru-
tiny. 175 The "in effect" transfer language itself may generate arguments,
however unsuccessful, that the statute suffers from unconstitutional
infirmities. 176
172. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1742.
173. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 453(j), 483(f), and 1274A(e) (Supp. V 1987).
174. TAMRA § 303 1(c) added a new I.R.C. § 2036(c)(8): "(8) Regulations - The Secre-
tary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the pur-
poses of this 'subsection, including such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to
prevent avoidance of the purposes of this subsection through distributions or otherwise."
TAMRA, spra note 14, at 3637. In the absence of the foregoing directive, the Secretary
would have nonetheless been able to rely upon the overall procedural authorization to "pre-
scribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title." I.R.C. § 7805(a)
(Supp. V 1987).
175. The "legislative" regulation is best exemplified by I.R.C. § 1502 (Supp. V 1987),
which states: "The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary ... 
Such a regulation has the force and effect of law, and cannot be invalidated unless clearly
contrary to the will of Congress. See Regal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 261, 263-264
(1969). From a practical standpoint, such a regulation will be upheld unless it contradicts the
express language of the statute or express legislative history. The TAMRA regulation direc-
tive does not substantially increase the authority otherwise available under I.R.C. § 7805(a).
See supra note 174. The regulations will be sustained, however, "unless unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes ...." Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber
Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948). In determining inconsistency with the statute, not only the
words of the statute, but rather the court's notions of the policy and objectives of Congress in
enacting the statute are applied. This gives the court a great deal of flexibility, which the
United States Tax Court exercised in Professional Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 165
(1987), in invalidating regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 4530) (Supp. V 1987).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 states in part: ". . . direct Taxes shall be apportioned
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b. Property Having a Disproportionately Large Share of the Potential
Appreciation in Such Person's Interest in the Enterprise
The phrase "disproportionately large share of the potential appreci-
ation" 77 is undefined in the statute, but the Revenue Act of 1987 Confer-
ence Committee Report offers a simple explanation: "[a]
disproportionately large share of potential appreciation is any share of
appreciation in the enterprise greater than the share of appreciation
borne by the property retained by the transferor."1
78
The only example of the application of this phrase in the 1987 Con-
ference Committee Report is more helpful:
Thus, if a person who owns a substantial interest in an enterprise and
whose only holdings in the enterprise consist of 100 shares of common
stock and 100 shares of preferred stock transfers 80 shares of the com-
mon stock and 20 shares of the preferred stock, only 60 shares of the
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respec-
tive Numbers .... " and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 states in part: "No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census in Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken." In the face of these limitations, the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted
in 1913, allowing the Congress to levy the income tax. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI states: "The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumer-
ation."
The estate and gift taxes have been held valid as an excise tax on the act of transfer, rather
than a direct tax on the property transferred. In Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1898 inheritance tax on the basis that it was a duty or
excise tax on the passing of property as the result of death, and therefore "not direct within the
meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 83. In New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921),
the Court followed the holding in Knowlton, which involved an inheritance tax, to uphold the
constitutionality of the present federal estate tax. The constitutionality of the gift tax was
upheld in Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929), where the Court noted that the power
to give was just one of the powers incident to ownership of property, and that a tax on the
power to give was not in essence a direct tax on the property itself. The inquiry of estate and
gift taxation, from a constitutional standpoint, has involved a search for a transfer of property
on which an excise tax is based. In United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194
(1960), the Court broadly construed the transfer requirement for constitutional law purposes.
The decedent had transferred all incidents to an insurance policy years before his death, but
continued to pay premium payments. Inclusion under the statute in effect at that time looked
to payment of premiums, but the taxpayer claimed that no "transfer" of the insurance had
occurred. The Court broadly viewed the estate tax as being levied on an overall transaction, a
testamentary disposition that began with the payment of the premiums and was completed at
death. The premium payments were a "generating source," although not resulting in a direct
transfer at death. Id. at 198. In interpreting the vague "in effect" transfer requirement, a
court may choose the avenue of refusing to complete the unfinished work of Congress in inter-
preting a woefully incomplete or vague statute, rather than entertaining constitutional objec-
tions that no "transfer" in a constitutional sense occurred.
177. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
178. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1742.
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transferred common stock are included in his estate under this
provision. 1
79
The House Ways and Means Committee Report proposal, rejected
by the Conference Agreement, utilized the same example, but concluded
that the value of "all stock, preferred and common, transferred to his
children would be included in [the transferor's] estate."' 8 0 Both the
House Ways and Means Committee Report and the Conference Agree-
ment would, however, permit a transfer of fifty percent of each of the
preferred and common stock classes without Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 2036(c) inclusion of any stock in the transferor's estate. 18
The loose language of the 1987 Conference Committee Report noted
above seemed to present a greater planning opportunity for structuring
disproportionate interests.182 The TAMRA House Report clarified the
disproportionate appreciation test, stating:
This standard may be understood by comparing two proportions. The
first is the potential appreciation attributable to the transferred prop-
erty divided by the value of such property. The second is the potential
appreciation attributable to the retained interest divided by the value
of that interest. If the first proportion exceeds the second, the dispro-
portionate appreciation test is met.'
8 3
Although the test is now more narrowly defined, the practical appli-




180. H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) 1044, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-1, 2313-660.
181. For those with modest avoidance objectives, a proportional gift of both preferred
stock and common stock offers some of the benefits of the classic freeze transaction. The cost
is two-fold. First, the gifted limited appreciation interests, such as preferred stock, will typi-
cally have a greater gift tax value than the growth interests. Second, the retained growth
interests obviously detract from the shift of future appreciation.
182. An example of such a structure of disproportionate interests is as follows (Example
2):
Parent recapitalizes CORP. and receives 100 percent of the preferred shares and
100 percent of the common shares. Parent then gifts 49 percent of the common
shares to Child, but retains all of the preferred shares and 51 percent of the common.
Under a literal reading of the 1987 Conference Committee Report, Parent did not transfer a
disproportionately large share of potential appreciation because the share of appreciation held
by Child was smaller than the share retained by Parent.
183. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 131, at 423 n. 120.
184. The following examples illustrate this issue regarding potential appreciation
(Example 3):
Parent recapitalizes X CORP, creating a common stock class and a preferred stock
class. The common is worth $100,000. The preferred is worth $3,000,000. The liq-
uidation value, today, of the common stock is $0. Its total value of $100,000 is the
discounted estimate of future earnings giving rise to appreciation. If Parent transfers
the common stock, retaining the preferred, the ratios are:
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4. While Retaining a Disproportionately Large Share in the Income
of, or Rights in, the Enterprise
Assuming that a transfer of a disproportionate share of future ap-
preciation in the enterprise has occurred, under the Revenue Act of 1987
version of the statute, the transferor must also have retained a "dispro-
portionately large share in the income of, or rights in, the enterprise." 185
The 1987 Conference Committee Report and the statute were silent as to
what constituted a "disproportionately large share." The 1987 Confer-
ence Committee Report did, however, state that "rights in the enterprise
include voting rights, conversion rights, liquidation rights, warrants, op-
tions, and other rights of value."' 186 There was concern that "rights" in
the enterprise would be read expansively to include, for example, em-
Transferred Common Stock: 1 = $100,000 (Potential Appreciation)
$100,000 (Value)'
Retained Preferred Stock: 0 = $0 (Potential Appreciation)
$3,000,000 (Value)
The test is met.
Example 4
Apply the values in Example 3 to the transfer in Example 2, supra note 182:
Transferred Common Stock: I = $49,000 (Potential Appreciation)
$49,000 (Value)
Retained Common and Preferred Stock: .02 = $51,000 (Potential Appreciation)
$3,051,000 (Value)
The test is again met, even for a situation apparently permitted by the Revenue Act of
1987 Conference Committee example. The Senate bill for.TAMRA did not raise this issue,
and the TAMRA Conference Agreement:
follows the Senate amendment, regarding the scope of section 2036(c), except that
the agreement follows the House bill provision eliminating language stating that the
retained income or rights must constitute a disproportionately large share of such
income or rights.
1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 163, at 5133-34. It is unclear whether this language
includes the general House Report discussion of the disproportionate appreciation test that
was not directly relevant to the issue of clarifying the retention test.
Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part III(C)(1), states that the share of potential appreciation
attributable to the transferor's interest in the enterprise is determined with reference to the
rights that the interest carries with respect to any future increase in the value of the enterprise.
With regard to shifting participation interests in the enterprise, the Notice determines
potential appreciation with respect to an interest by assuming circumstances which would
maximize the share of potential appreciation attributable to the transferor's interest before the
transfer, and minimize the share of potential appreciation attributable to the transferor's inter-
est after the transfer. This concept is described in Example 14 of the Notice. Example 14 is
not particularly instructive of the manner in which the potential appreciation element is to be
determined for comparison with the whole value of an interest because it addresses a situation
which begins as a simple 50/50, strictly proportional sharing of profits, for which appreciation
easily follows.
185. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
186. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, 2313-1742.
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ployment contracts with the corporation or deferred compensation
arrangements. 
87
In TAMRA, Congress responded to these difficulties by substituting
a test, described as a confirmation of the existing law, that looks only to
"retaining an interest in the income of, or rights in, the enterprise."'' 88
The broadened retention test was tempered by the TAMRA inclusion of
safe harbors for certain loans, employment, sales of goods, and other re-
lationships. 89 The Service has, on the one hand, administratively nar-
rowed the retention rule such that a retained interest does not include
duties in serving as a trustee or other fiduciary.' 90 On the other hand,
the Service has given notice that it will construe the retained interest
language expansively, and would include employment agreements and
retirement arrangements. This will place even greater significance on
satisfying the safe harbors.19'
187. Similar issues are encountered in determining if a complete termination of share-
holder interest has occurred for purposes of I.R.C. § 302. In redemptions purporting to com-
pletely terminate a shareholder's interest, the judicial decisions and administrative
pronouncements have permitted the shareholder's retention of interests as: a landlord (Rev.
Rul. 70-639, 1970-2 C.B. 74); officer and director (Rev. Rul. 76-524, 1976-2 C.B. 94); a benefi-
ciary of an escrow of the stock, established as a security device (Lisle v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 627 (1976)). Compare Rev. Rul. 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92, which suggests that
rent dependent on future earnings or subordinate to general creditors may be a proprietary
interest. The rules for an I.R.C. § 302(c)(2) (Supp. V 1987) termination of interest are, how-
ever, even more strict and include as a prohibited "interest in the corporation," interests as
"officer, director, or employee." Id.
188. TAMRA, § 3031(e), at 3637. The Conference Committee Report does not explain
the amendment to the retention rule. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 163, at
5134. However, the explanation of the House bill terms the change a "clarification," stating:
"This clarification confirms that, under present law, granting a disproportionately large share
of potential appreciation necessarily entails the retention of a disproportionately large share of
income or other rights in the enterprise." 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 131, at 423.
189. See supra note 157.
190. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part IV. Examples 22 and 23 of the Notice are interest-
ing. Example 22 holds that if a settlor places stock in a trust, the settlor has not retained an
interest in the enterprise, despite the fact that the trustee has the power (in the trustee's abso-
lute discretion) to invade corpus for the settlor's benefit. One can assume that the settlor did
not have the right to remove the trustee without cause in contravention of the Service's posi-
tion in Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325. In Example 23, the settlor retained a "5 or 5"
power to withdraw $5,000 annually from the trust. This right was considered a retained inter-
est in the trust.
191. "An 'interest in the income of an enterprise' may be embodied in any form of interest
(present or future), agreement, or arrangement, including, without limitation, preferred equity
interest in the enterprise, a promissory note, a life or term interest, an employment agreement,
a retirement arrangement, a sale agreement, and a lease agreement." Notice 89-99, supra note
141, Part IV. "Voting rights" include: "(1) the right to vote corporate stock; (2) the right as a
limited partner to select, and consent to the acts of, a general partner; and (3) the right as a
general partner to participate in the management of the partnership." Id.
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C. Special Rules and Other Complicating Factors
1. Dispositions of Interests by the Decedent/Transferor
The estate tax provision for transfers with retained powers or inter-
ests, of which the freeze limitations are now a part, excludes transfers by
the decedent for "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." 192 An obvious estate tax avoidance device would be the sale of
the growth interest, for example, the common stock, to the younger gen-
eration upon implementation of the freeze structure, such that a transfer
under the retained powers or interests provisions would not occur. On
the other hand, even if the original transfer were not for adequate and
full consideration, the decedent could free his or her estate of the perni-
cious retained power or interest by a sale of the interest before death.
The first avoidance technique relies upon the adequate and full consider-
ation exception on the transfer of the growth interest to completely
render the statute inapplicable at the outset. The second avoidance tech-
nique relies upon disposing of the retained interest.
The Revenue Act of 1987 legislation anticipated the first avoidance
technique. The statute provided that the sales for adequate and full con-
sideration exception does not apply to transfers to a member of the trans-
feror's family. 93 However, the statute arguably would not have
restricted the subsequent sale to family members of the retained limited
appreciation interest if the disquieting effect of decisions such as
Gradow' 94 could be overcome.
TAMRA addressed the foregoing issues, adding a further measure
of complexity. With respect to subsequent transferor or transferee dispo-
sitions, the legislation creates a deemed gift to the transferee in the
amount that otherwise would have been includable in the transferor's
192. This exception is found in the parenthetical language of I.R.C. § 2036(a) (Supp. V
1987).
193. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2) (Supp. V 1987). The definition of family is that used in deter-
mining whether the transferor held a substantial interest in an enterprise. However, the "di-
rectly or indirectly" language and entity attribution language that was part of the substantial
interest requirement does not literally apply to the definition of "family." I.R.C.
§ 2036(c)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1987) states in part: "Family - The term 'family' means, with respect
to any individual, such individual's spouse, any lineal descendant of such individual or of such
individual's spouse, any parent or grandparent of such individual, and any spouse of any of the
foregoing. ... Consequently, the statute seemingly could be circumvented by a sale of the
retained interest to an entity owned by a family member.
194. See supra note 95. In the sole footnote to its Report, the Revenue Act of 1987 Con-
ference Committee noted: "[The property subject to the retained interest that was sold] may
be includable even if the retained interest is sold for its fair market value during the three-year
period." See United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961). 1987 CONFERENCE RE-
PORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1741.
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estate under section 2036(c), if either: (1) the original transferor trans-
fers all or any portion of his or her retained interest to anyone, or (2) the
original transferee transfers all or any portion of the transferred property
to a person who is not a member of the original transferor's family. 195
The first provision eliminates the advantages of disposing of one's
retained interest, by sale or gift, to avoid inclusion of the growth interest,
because the post-freeze appreciation in the growth interest will be cap-
tured by the gift tax at the time of disposition. The second provision has
a mixed effect. It does clarify the issue of whether the estate of the trans-
feror will pay an estate tax on the growth interest that has been already
transferred out of the family unit, and for which future appreciation con-
sequently will not continue to accrue. On the other hand, a deemed gift
by the original transferor is again created. In a simple Senate Report
example, the operation of the technical corrections is reasonably clear:
For example, assume that a person who holds all the preferred and
common stock in a corporation gives away the common stock while
retaining the preferred stock. If the transferor or transferee subse-
quently transfers all of his stock to a person outside the transferor's
family, the original transferor is treated as having made a gift with
respect to the common stock at that point in time. The amount of the
gift equals the fair m arket value of the common stock at the time of the
subsequent transfer reduced by the fair market value of the common
stock at the time of the initial transfer. The common stock will not
thereafter be included in the transferor's estate under section 2036(c)
or subsequently give rise to a deemed gift under the provisions. 196
If a limited life retained interest were used, 197 the expiration of the
retained interest, by its own terms, might not have been considered as a
transfer within the foregoing provisions. This loophole was immediately
spotted by persons analyzing the Revenue Act of 1987.198 The TAMRA
amendments responded by including "terminations, lapses, and other
195. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4) (amended 1988).
196. 1988 SENATE REPORT, supra note 131.
197. An example of a limited life interest is as follows (Example 5):
Parent recapitalizes CORP, receiving preferred stock and common stock. Par-
ent gifts the common stock to Children, retaining the preferred stock. The "pre-
ferred" stock, however, retains its preferred characteristics only for a given number
of years (hopefully the period of greatest appreciation for CORP), after which the
stock automatically converts into common stock.
Arguably, no transfer of the retained interest has occurred; instead, the preferred stock
has been converted by its own terms, and not by any action of the transferor.
198. As just one example, the author has a flyer of a planning firm which labeled this
structure as an estate freeze "without tax consequences under IRC Section 2036(c)." Manage-
ment Planning, Inc., Flyer, Estate Freezing Without Tax Consequences Under IRC Section
2036(c) (1988).
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changes in any interest in property of the original transferor or original
transferee,"'' 99 as subsequent transfers.
200
The statute's provision, that sales to family members will not be
deemed as for adequate and full consideration, departs from well-estab-
lished wealth transfer tax principles of what constitutes a gift. While
there is some precedent for treating related party dealings differently
than arm's length transactions, 20 1 it has been asserted that this provision
may unconstitutionally discriminate against sales to family members.
20 2
Singling out family transactions in this limited context probably does not
rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity, particularly in view of the
expansive reading given by the courts to the exercise of the power to
tax. 203
199. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(D)(iv) (amended 1988).
200. Transfers of portions of interests are addressed by the technical corrections, with the
proportionate amount transferred being treated as a gift and with the otherwise prevailing
treatment for the remainder. Referring to the common stock, preferred stock recapitalization
example, the explanation notes:
[I]f the transferor or the transferee subsequently transfers half of his stock to a person
not a member of the transferor's family, the transferor is treated as having made a
gift with respect to half of the common stock at that point in time, and that half is
not includible in his estate. If no later deemed gift occurs, the other half of the
common stock is includible in the transferor's estate.
1988 SENATE REPORT, supra note 131, at 5026.
201. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (Supp. V 1987), which prohibits the recognition of a loss in a
sale or exchange between related parties.
202. See Covey, supra note 152. Professor Bittker, commenting on the family attribution
rules that apply absolutely to corporate transactions states: "Lacking, as they do, any mecha-
nism to relieve the taxpayer of attribution from relatives who are clearly independent or hos-
tile, it is surprising that the attribution rules have not been subjected to more political and even
constitutional attack." Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1389, 1462 (1975). See Bloch v. United States, 261 F.Supp. 597 (S.D. Tex. 1966), aff'dper
curiam, 386 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1967) (Court rejected, without discussion, the taxpayer's argu-
ment that the attribution rules are unconstitutional). See also Estate of Johnson v. Commis-
sioner, 42 T.C. 441 (1964) (the court rejected an argument that I.R.C. § 267 was
unconstitutional. However, the argument was not based on equal protection arguments, but
rather on a constitutional concept of gross income.).
203. Only one recent case has invalidated a tax statute on the basis of equal protection,
and it involved distinctions based on sex, a suspect class. See Moritz v. Commissioner, 469
F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972).
In determining the existence of a gift, for example, a distinction is made between arm's
length business transactions and all other transactions. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958) states
that a gift will occur to the extent "that the value of the property transferred by the donor
exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration given therefor." The regu-
lation, however, provides for an ordinary course of business exception in which the relative
values of the transferred property and the consideration will not be scrutinized. Id. "... [A]
sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a trans-
action which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent) will be considered
as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." Id. This excep-
tion would not apply to a typical family gift situation. However, there have been several intra-
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The constitutional objections are further diluted by TAMRA
amendments that enable a family member to acquire an interest and limit
application of section 2036(c) if the purchase price was never received or
acquired, directly or indirectly, from the transferor for less than full and
adequate consideration in money or money's worth.2°4 The adjustment
for consideration paid by the transferee utilizes an exclusion based on the
relative value of consideration as compared with the value of the interest
that would otherwise be included in the estate of the transferor. 20 5 The
family transfers in which the courts have applied the ordinary course of business rule. See,
e.g., Estate of Friedman v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 714 (1963); Messing v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 502 (1967), acq., 1968-1 C.B. 2; Shelton v. Lockhart, 154 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
Congress has the constitutional power to draw distinctions between classes of taxpayers
and transactions, only so long as the distinction is rationally related to an overall purpose. See
Keeler v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 279 (1978); Grauvogel v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH)
1269 (1984); Sjoroos v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 971 (1983). Professor Cooper originally pro-
posed a bona fide sale in the "ordinary course of business and without any significant donative
purpose" exception for sales in connection with freeze transactions. He would, however, cre-
ate a rebuttable presumption that sales to specified family members were donative in nature.
Cooper, supra note 12, at 239.
Because one cannot meaningfully separate a possible sale of the unfrozen interest from the
overall tax avoidance technique, the statutory presumption is necessary to preserve the efficacy
of the statute. This is particularly true because the freeze transaction could be structured such
that the growth interest would have a very nominal claimed value. The sale for adequate
consideration, which is a reasonable exception in other contexts, cannot be extended to this
statute because it would open an easy avenue for avoidance. The exception is narrowly drawn
and applies only to the estate freeze statute, a situation in which the sale would be an integral
part of the overall tax avoidance package. For example, in one case an irrebuttable presump-
tion was upheld because the expense and difficulties of individual determinations justified a
prophylactic rule. See Sakol v. Commissioner, 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 859 (1978). The court required a rational relationship between criteria set forth in the
statute and a legitimate congressional purpose. In that regard, an attempt to limit tax avoid-
ance was considered a rational purpose. But see Heiner. v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932)(ir-
rebuttable presumption was held violative of due process). Consequently, it is wise that the
statute is conclusively drafted without presumptions of any kind. To propose that there is
discrimination between similarly situated taxpayers is based upon the premise that taxpayers
selling property outright to family members are engaged in a transaction that is essentially
similar to selling an unfrozen part of a freeze structure. Recognize that the term "outright" is
a little circular. To state the issue as "outright" sales as compared with freeze sales, is to first
assume that freeze interests are not separate property interests that can be bought or sold.
Drawing the line between sales of individual, simple interests and proscribed freeze transac-
tions is the fundamental issue which plagues the statute. On one pole is the corporate recapi-
talization; at the other is a sale or gift of the proverbial gift horse. Although one intuitively
seems more prone to tax avoidance than the other, perhaps we shy away from the complexity
of the one transaction. One cannot easily distinguish the underlying difference between the
transactions.
204. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B) (amended 1988).
205. The 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT provides the following example:
A parent owns all the common and preferred stock in a corporation worth $2 mil-
lion. After December 17, 1987, the parent sells to his child the common stock for $1
million not directly or indirectly received or acquired from the parent. If the parent
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Service has been directed to issue regulations that will tackle the difficult




a. Collection of Tax from Transferees
The Revenue Act of 1987 freeze provisions could operate to include
property in a transferor's estate, while ownership of the property and the
source of payment for the transfer taxes fell to another party. This prob-
lem was not confined to the freeze provisions and plagued all transfers
subject to section 2036. In TAMRA, Congress added a new section
2207B, which permits a recovery of the estate tax, and in some cases the
gift tax, from the recipient of the property.
continues to hold the preferred stock until his death, one half of the value of the
corporation is includable in the parent's estate.
1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 163, at 5136.
206. The 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT notes that, "The Secretary might, for example, ele-
vate the standard of proof for making such demonstration. Or, the Secretary might create a
presumption that consideration was received from gifts made by the transferor to the trans-
feree within a certain period of time." Id. Note that a clear waiting period will advantage
those taxpayers with the time for advance planning, and the wherewithal to make transfers in
their discretion. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part VII supplied restrictive guidelines for
determining if consideration is received from the transferor. Consideration furnished by the
transferee is presumed to come from property received or acquired from the transferor. Prop-
erty received from the transferor includes that received from the transferor's spouse. Proceeds,
gain, and income from property are deemed to be from the same source as the property from
which they are derived. Amounts borrowed from the transferor are deemed acquired or re-
ceived if pursuant to a "gift loan" described in I.R.C. § 7872(f)(3). A gift loan only arises if a
below-market loan is utilized so this could be satisfied by a loan utilizing the appropriate
I.R.C. § 7872 interest rate. Amounts borrowed from third parties are deemed received from
the transferor to the extent the transferee's repayment obligation is guaranteed or collateral-
ized by the transferor for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
Further, to rebut the presumption the transferee must prove that (1) the transferee acquired
property from sources other than the transferor in amounts sufficient, considering only a rea-
sonable rate of growth, to enable the transferee to accumulate the consideration, and (2) the
tranferee's financial ability to furnish such portion of the consideration was not to any extent
dependent on the acquisition or receipt of property from the transferor during the three years
immediately preceding the disproportionate transfer. What an administrative nightmare!
Moreover, could not wealthy non-transferor family members, other than spouses, extend loans
or gifts to the transferee? President Bush reportedly got his start in the oil business with a
sizable loan from an uncle. It would appear that the ability to loan money to the transferee, at
the I.R.C. § 7872 rate creates a large loophole. If the new enterprise is truly profitable as
expected, loan repayments can be made out of the profits. If not, then a non-recourse loan
may mitigate this risk, disguising a gift loan intent.
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b. Adjustment for Changes in Corporate Structure
The statute requires "appropriate adjustments" to reflect extraordi-
nary distributions and other changes in the capital structure of the enter-
prise after the transfer.20 7 The legislative history states that some
adjustments may be required, for example, to reflect subsequent capital
contributions by the transferee. 208 The Conference Committee Report
suggests that the approach is a refinement of the overall adjustment for
consideration received from the transferee.
20 9
IV. Assessing the Statute's Impact on Existing Valuation
Limiting Techniques
The statutory language is by most accounts vague; the Service has
admitted as much.210 In its first interpretative announcement concerning
section 2036(c), Notice 89-99, 2 1 the Service has turned to meaning that
"can only be ascertained by reference to Congressional intent as reflected
in the statute's essential themes and underlying committee reports. '212
Although the Treasury has authority to issue regulations, that power is
not absolute. 21 3 The interpretations discussed in Notice 89-99 will need
to withstand scrutiny in the face of uncertain or undisclosed legislative
intent.
A. Preferred Stock Recapitalizations and Partnership Asset Freezes
The sole example provided in the Conference Committee Report for
the Revenue Act of 1987 was of a simple preferred stock-common stock
207. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5) (amended 1988).
208. 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 163, at 5136. This provision is subject to a
number of technical difficulties in interpretation beyond the scope of this article. For a discus-
sion, see Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 140, at 75-77.
209. The adjustment language is found in I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5), which states, "Appropriate
adjustments shall be made in the amount included in the gross estate by reason of this subsec-
tion for the value of the retained interest, extraordinary distributions, and changes in the capi-
tal structure of the enterprise after the transfer described in paragraph (1)." This provision
reflects a TAMRA amendment which expanded the prior I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5), which stated,
"In lieu of applying section 2043, appropriate adjustments shall be made for the value of the
retained interest." Id. The provision addressing consideration furnished by family members,
discussed supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text, is found at I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2). The
language of I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5) could be read as a general adjustment provision, rather than as
a refinement of the furnished consideration rule, although the few sentences in the Conference
Committee Report seem to be using the provision in the latter context. 1988 CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 163, at 5136.
210. See supra note 141.
211. See supra note 141.
212. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Overview (B).
213. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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corporate recapitalization. That type of transaction was clearly contem-
plated by Congress when drafting the statute. Additionally, in the 1987
Conference Committee Report, partnership asset freezes were also ex-
pressly included.
2 14
Under the pre-TAMRA statute, the focus of planners shifted to lim-
ited life freezes and inter vivos extrication from the freeze structure. 21 5
The TAMRA amendments answered the limited freeze with the deemed
gift provisions that apply to terminations of interests and probably in-
clude shifting equity interests. 21 6 Planners have been left with propor-
tional freezes that still present some limited benefits. 2 17 In addition, if a
business owner desires to transfer the ownership of a business while re-
taining control, the use of a combination of voting and non-voting com-
mon stock will be permitted.
21 8
214. The conference Committee Report provides:
For example, if, after December 17, 1987, a person who holds all the preferred and
common stock in a corporation transfers the common stock and retains the preferred
stock until his death, the common stock is includible in his estate. Likewise, a simi-
lar transaction undertaken by transferring a partnership interest with greater rights
to appreciation than the retained interest will result in the transferred interest being
included in the estate.
1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1742.
215. The partnership capital freeze would have become even more popular, as it may per-
mit a dissolution of the freeze structure without immediate income tax consequences. For
example, assume that a parent created a partnership capital freeze with the children holding
the growth interests. If gifting the parent's frozen interest to the children would trigger a gift,
not only of the value of the retained interest but of the amount includable under I.R.C.
§ 2036(c), the parent could instead cause a dissolution of the partnership. All of the partners
would receive in kind distributions of the partnership property, which they would hold in
various undivided proportions. Assuming that the "enterprise" continues, parent arguably
retains only a proportionate share of the income from or rights in the enterprise. The directive
to the Treasury to prescribe regulations to prevent avoidance expressly refers to "through
distributions or otherwise." I.R.C. § 2036(c)(8) (enacted 1988). The TAMRA Senate Report
expresses the concern that liquidating distributions could be used to avoid the freeze restric-
tions. In a corporate structure, dividends could be used to drain the corporation of value at
appropriate times e.g., before the death of the elder generation member. In particular, a distri-
bution "substantially equivalent to a liquidation" might be treated as a deemed gift of the
amount that otherwise would have been included in the transferor's estate. 1988 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 131, at 5028.
216. The House Report states:
Terminations, lapses and other changes in any interest in property of the transferor
or transferee are treated as transfers under the provision. For example, if a person
gives away common stock in an enterprise while retaining preferred stock which by
its terms retires in ten years, there is a deemed gift with respect to the common stock
at the end of the ten years.
1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 131 at 420.
217. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
218. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part III, Example 17, addresses a dual stock structure.
The capital structure of the corporation in question consisted of 100 shares of non-voting
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B. Buy-Sell Agreements and Purchase Options
While some of the case law may suggest that the judicial scrutiny of
intra-family buy-sell agreements has been too liberal, 219 a more appropri-
ate response would be in the form of legislation specifically addressing
buy-sell agreements. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation sin-
gled out a relative of the buy-sell arrangement, the long-term intra-family
purchase option, as an abusive valuation freezing technique in its De-
scription of Possible Options to Increase Revenues Proposal for the
Committee on Ways and Means. 220 At the time the staff produced its
report, the pro-taxpayer District Court decision in Dorn v. US.221 was
reportedly generating "near euphoria in the estate planning commu-
nity."' 222 At the time of the Conference Committee deliberations on the
Revenue Act of 1987, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
dampened tax planner enthusiasm with its reversal of -the lower court
decision.
223
Some commentators224 have suggested that the following Revenue
Act of 1987 Conference Committee Report language would exempt buy-
sell agreements, and arguably purchase options as well. The Committee
report stated, "[tihe provision only makes certain property includible in




common stock and 100 shares of voting common stock. The two classes of stock differ only
with respect to voting power. (Compare I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4) (Supp. V 1987), which permits
dual stock structures in an S corporation where there are only differences in voting rights
among shares of common stock).. On these facts, the Notice concludes that the transfer of the
non-voting stock to the sole shareholder's son does not give rise to a transfer of property
having a disproportionately large share of potential appreciation.
219. See supra note 102.
220. DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS, supra note 120, at 266.
221. 86-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 13,701 (W.D. Pa. 1986). Mrs. Dorn gifted options to
acquire stock held in her personal portfolio to thirty-six of her children and grandchildren.
The options were nonassignable except by operation by law, and none were exercised prior to
her death. The District court held that Mrs. Dorn's taxable estate included only the exercise
price of the optioned stock, and not its fair market value. The effect was that all appreciation
arising after the grant of the options had shifted to the option holders. Id.
222. Abbin, supra note 11l, at 10.
223. Dom v. United States, 828 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1987). The appeals court found that no
bona fide business arrangement existed, and applied Treas. Reg. § 20.2131-2(h) (1958), disre-
garding the value depressing effect of the options for estate taxation purposes as "a device to
pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects of [her] bounty for less than adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth." Id.
224. In discussions with legislative staff, Mr. Covey learned that the apparent intent of the
Committee Report language was to exclude buy-sell arrangements. See Covey, supra note 152.
225. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 2313-1742.
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The language might be construed as validating the existing valuation
approach applicable to buy-sell agreements and options. That interpreta-
tion is subject to question. The context of the passage is one of inclusion
under Internal Revenue Code section 2036(c). As a result, the statement
could mean that inclusion under section 2036(c) and valuation are not
mutually exclusive. The Treasury could assert that the freeze was inef-
fective, and the retained interest was not frozen. Alternatively, the
Treasury could assert that section 2036(c) does apply and the growth
interest is includable. Another possible reason for the inclusion of the
foregoing language might be to clear up any existing confusion remaining
from the House Ways and Means Committee's version of the 1987 stat-
ute, which addressed minority discount freeze issues by adopting a new
valuation section.
226
An existing TAMRA safe harbor does exclude options or other
agreements to buy or sell property at the fair market value of the prop-
erty as of the time the option is exercised. 227 Qualifying for the exemp-
tion would eliminate most of the estate tax valuation advantage
otherwise available with a buy-sell agreement. The Service has adminis-
tratively interpreted this exemption as not requiring a price determined
by appraisal. The Service will consider a buy-sell agreement as qualify-
ing for the exception if the sales price is determined under a formula,
based on currently acceptable valuation techniques, that reasonably can
be expected to produce a result that approximates the fair market value
of the property at the time the sale is consummated.
228
The fundamental question remains as to whether buy-sell agree-
ments are even properly the subject of section 2036(c). An ominous neg-
ative inference was created by the 1988 House Ways and Means
Committee Report's use of a buy-sell agreement in its example of qualifi-
cation under the safe harbor.229 However, the House Ways and Means
Committee description of its version of TAMRA stated that the safe
226. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. TAMRA also affected the valuation
of property interests such as annuities, life estates, remainders, and reversions through the
addition of I.R.C. § 7520, which prescribes actuarial tables more closely tied to prescribing
interest rates,
227. See supra note 157.
228. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part V(E). A good faith buy-sell agreement that adopts
a formula generally recognized as suitable to the valuation of the type of property involved and
acceptable in arm's-length negotiations taking place at the time the agreement is executed
meets the safe harbor. A bona fide agreement exclusively among persons who are not members
of the same family meets such requirements. Example 26 of the Notice concludes that a
formula based on book value is not an acceptable valuation method for valuing a real estate
investment venture. Both parties to the agreement were family members.
229. See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 131, at 427.
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harbors do not create an inference as to the treatment of transactions
falling outside of them. 230 The Service has asserted that, "by reasonable
inference," the safe harbors illustrate the types of arrangements that, if
ineligible for the safe harbors, are within the scope of the statute.
231
One could argue that if an elder generation member agrees to sell his
or her interest in the enterprise to younger family members for a fixed
price, the statute might apply. In this scenario, the elder generation
member clearly held an interest in the enterprise. By obligating himself
or herself to the agreement, the elder generation member transferred a
property right to the younger generation. If the purchase price was fixed,
that is, not based on an appraisal or on a formula reflecting future appre-
ciation, a disproportionately large share of potential appreciation in the
enterprise would be transferred to the younger generation.
Under the Revenue Act of 1987 language, as applicable to the pre-
ceding example, the retention of a disproportionately large share of in-
come or rights in the enterprise might not have been satisfied. If viewed
as of the time of execution of the agreement, and in the absence of any
consulting agreement or other special rights, it would be doubtful that
the elder generation had retained such an interest. Moreover, in a tradi-
tional mutual buy-sell agreement, where the younger family members are
also obligated to sell to the elder generation if certain events occur, the
argument is even stronger that all parties have given something up and
received something in return, and that no disproportionate retention of
rights in the enterprise has occurred with respect to any party. If the
probability of the occurrence of the elder generation's death or other
buy-sell triggering event is so much greater than that attributable to the
younger generation, it would seem that the younger generation, if any-
one, has greater or disproportionate rights in the enterprise. TAMRA's
deletion of the retention of a disproportionately large share of income or
rights in favor of a simple retention of an interest in the income or rights
in the enterprise,232 however, makes an easier case for application of the
statute.
230. Id. at 424.
231. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Overview (B). In footnote 2, the Service noted that it
"rejects the suggestion of some commentators that the quoted statement requires it to disre-
gard the exceptions in delineating the statute's scope because the suggestion implies that Con-
gress either did not know what it intended or added the exceptions as a meaningless
appendage." Id.
232. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
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C. Installment Sales
The installment sale of property can achieve an estate freezing ef-
fect,233 and the valuation freeze limitations can therefore apply. In such
a situation, there has been a transfer of property to the younger genera-
tion. Because the sale is to a family member, the statute still prospec-
tively applies even if the price is fair, subject to the supplied
consideration adjustment. 234 If a fixed price is used, which would usually
be the case in a family situation, where limiting estate values is a desire of
the parties, the future appreciation in the enterprise has been transferred
to the younger generation.
Under the Revenue Act of 1987, the pivotal question was whether
the elder generation had retained a disproportionately large share of the
income or rights in the enterprise. If the elder generation were permit-
ted, in a corporation, for example, to hold the shares as collateral for the
purchase money obligation, to vote on major corporate decisions (even if
only upon a monetary default), and were paid a guaranteed fixed interest
rate, one could come very close in substance to the position of a preferred
shareholder. The TAMRA amendments did not directly resolve the con-
fusion, 235 but in a practical sense, had likely eliminated many installment
sales from the statute's application. First, if the consideration for the
purchase comes only from the purchasing party, the new consideration
rules should exclude a portion of the property from the seller's estate.
236
Second, the installment obligation itself could be structured to fall within
the prescribed debt safe harbors.
237
233. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 192-215 and accompanying text.
235. The Service-has taken the position that installment sales are subject to the statute.
Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Overview (B).
236. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. A self-cancelling installment obliga-
tion would, however, detract from this result because the consideration would probably be
deemed to come from the transferor. The Service has asserted that such an obligation also fails
the qualified debt safe harbor. See Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part V(C).
237. See supra note 157. The TAMRA Senate Report offers the example of a shareholder
whose common stock is redeemed in exchange for qualified debt and retained no other interest
in the enterprise. 1988 SENATE REPORT, supra note 131, at 5031. The Report concludes that
I.R.C. § 2036(c) does not apply so long as the former shareholder holds only qualified debt.
Example 24 of Notice 89-99, supra note 141, presents an installment purchase of corporate
stock. The retention of interest issue is addressed by direction to the debt safe harbors.
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D. Sales of Remainders and Private Annuities
1. Sales of Remainders
The sale of a remainder 238 was likely subject to the Revenue Act of
1987 statute, a conclusion in which the Service has concurred. 239 The
remainder interest that captured future appreciation enjoyed a dispropor-
tionate share, if not all, of future appreciation in the enterprise. The life
income interest retained by the seller was retention of a disproportionate
share, if not all, of the income from the enterprise. The sale of remainder
apparently continues to be subject to the statute, but the consideration
rule added by TAMRA would tend to mitigate the effect of the statute,
particularly if the value of the remainder is significant. 2
40
2. Private Annuities
The private annuity is akin to the sale of a remainder, 241 but formal-
istically at least, the structure is different. In this type of arrangement,
the elder generation/transferor parts with all interest in the enterprise
outright for an annuity obligation, which is, in effect, a separate contrac-
tual promise. The statute should not apply to these arrangements if the
annuity is not considered an interest retained in the enterprise. In that
regard, the annuity probably cannot be secured by the property sold, and
usually would not be for income tax reasons.242 Despite these formal
distinctions, the Service has asserted that private annuities are subject to
section 2036(c). 2
4 3
The TAMRA amendments are of mixed effect as applied to the pri-
vate annuity. Even if the private annuity could be considered a debt obli-
gation, the debt safe harbor provisions probably cannot be satisfied
definitionally. On the other hand, if the statute would otherwise apply to
private annuities, the provided consideration rule could limit the appreci-
ation attributed to the transferor. 24
4
238. See supra note 100.
239. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Overview (B).
240. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. See also Jones, supra note 139.
241. See supra note 101.
242. See 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); Estate of Bell v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 469 (1973).
243. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Overview (B).
244. See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
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E. Grantor Retained Income Trusts
The grantor retained income trust 245 perhaps avoided the out-
stretched net of the Revenue Act of 1987. However, under TAMRA the
lapse of the retained income interest by its own terms will be treated as a
transfer by the settlor for purposes of the deemed gift provisions. 246 The
termination of the grantor's income interest will be considered such a
deemed gift unless the exception for "qualified trust income interests"
applies. Under this exception, the freeze provisions will not apply to a
trust if the retained right to income does not exceed ten years, the person
holding the right is also the transferor of the property to the trust, and
the transferor is not the trustee. 247 The Service has stated that the gran-
tor-retained income trust is otherwise subject to the statute. 248 However,
the Service has indicated that a contingent reversion or general power of
appointment held by the transferor will not invalidate use of the safe
harbor exception, if the value of the interest is insubstantial relative to
the value of the retained interest in income.
249
F. Joint Purchase of Split Interests and New Enterprise Formation
1. Joint Purchases
If the elder generation and the younger generation each use their
separate funds to purchase a jointly held interest, the statute should not
apply. Each party is contributing money, which by itself should not be
considered an enterprise, 250 to acquire an enterprise, and the elder gener-
ation member has therefore neither held nor transferred an interest in an
enterprise. If the elder generation member gifted the funds for the
purchase to the younger generation member as part of the overall trans-
action, the estate tax consequences are placed in greater jeopardy. 25I The
245. See supra note 104.
246. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
247. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(6) (enacted 1988)
248. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Overview (B).
249. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part V(B). For this purpose, the Notice considers a
contingent reversion or general power of appointment to be insubstantial if its value does not
exceed twenty-five percent of the value of the retained income interest, determined without
regard to the value of the reversion or power.
250. See supra note 152.
251. See, e.g., Gordon v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 309 (1985). One might argue that even in
this situation, the elder generation member is gifting money and not an interest in the enter-
prise. That argument, however, gambles with the propensity of courts to apply the step trans-
action doctrine. If the gift of the funds is part of an overall plan to acquire the split interests,
there seems to be no reason, other than respect for formalities, to validate this transaction.
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Service has asserted that the joint purchase of split interests is subject to
section 2036(c).
252
2. New Enterprise Formation
Formation of a new enterprise presents similar issues. If all of the
founders are contributing cash to a new enterprise, the statute should not
apply because no generation member held an interest in an enterprise, or
transferred such an interest. This scenario is to be contrasted with the
creation of a family holding company, where the statute should apply if
the elder generation is simply rebottling existing enterprises into a new
ownership vessel, thereby transferring the growth interests to the
younger generation in the process.
25 3
The formation of the new enterprise, however, might be subject to
the statute, even with cash exclusively, if one expansively applies the "in
effect transfer" language. One could argue that the elder generation's
acquiescence in receiving preferred stock upon incorporation would re-
sult in an "in effect transfer" of a disproportionately large share of poten-
tial appreciation in the enterprise where, for example, common stock
goes to the younger generation. In the absence of bona fide business rea-
sons for acquiring solely preferred stock, most founders would presuma-
bly want some common stock, preferred stock or debt enjoying liberal
conversion rights, or warrants if estate tax avoidance factors were
ignored.
Even if the foregoing argument is valid, it ignores the statutory lan-
guage, which requires that a person first hold "a substantial interest in an
enterprise." Because this requirement is not prefaced with "in effect" or
direct or indirect language, it would be difficult to argue that the elder
generation in effect held a substantial interest in an enterprise, and then
in effect transferred a portion of it.254 The Service has rejected this inter-
252. See Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Overview (B). It is questionable whether much
comfort can be derived from the Conference Committee's rejection of the 1988 House bill
provision, which would have clearly restricted split purchases. See supra notes 158-63 and
accompanying text.
253. This would be the result under the TAMRA Conference Committee Report. See
supra note 163 and accompanying text.
254. One could argue that the holding of a substantial interest is met by receiving the
preferred stock and that the interest in effect transferred need never have been held by the
transferor, so long as the transferor through any means held a substantial interest in the enter-
prise. Even under such a confusing construction, the formation of a family capital corporation
would still be covered because the elder generation held an interest in the prior enterprise.
Arguably, the purpose of the statute is more frustrated by the recapitalization, holding com-
pany formation, and other estate tax avoidance motivated restructuring of an established en-
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pretation, arguing that the statute applies. 255 The Service's treatment
rests upon the assumption that a transferor hypothetically acquires a
share of every interest and right in the enterprise in proportion to the
value of the loan or capital contribution in comparison with the value of
the enterprise after the transaction. If rights are disproportionately allo-
cated, a transfer has occurred.
256
G. Summarizing the Effect of the Legislation in Application
The estate valuation freeze limitations, as amended, are subject to
avoidance by those who are most capable of estate tax avoidance; not the
pioneer entrepreneurs, but those with extensive business expertise, con-
nections, and cash from prior established enterprises. If the younger gen-
eration is inexperienced in business, it would typically not be a taxable
event if one generation transfers to another, a business or investment tip
terprise that already has, or is preparing to, take off. This is to be contrasted with the
formation of an untested and unproven new enterprise which is untested and unproven.
On the other hand, if the younger generation is comprised of infants or other parties
unable or unwilling to participate in the business, it is unclear why appreciation in an untried
business is more desirable for an estate tax exemption than appreciation from an established
business. Granted, the estate tax avoidance in an established business is much more tangible
and predictable, and one might argue that fewer restrictions should be placed on new en-
treprenurial endeavors as compared with mature enterprises. However, if the dividing line is
existing enterprises and new enterprises, there must be some basis on which one separates
related businesses. That is, if the elder generation takes his or her expertise in oil, computers,
perfumes, or dry cleaning, for example, and cash, and establishes a new separate and distinct
business in another state or another country, is the new business a "new" enterprise or an
extension of the old.
The distinction between "old" and "new" businesses, compared with simple enlargements
of existing businesses, fostered litigation in the area of divisive corporate reorganizations. See,
e.g., Estate of Lockwood v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965), where the issue was
whether a new Maine corporation was a new business, or an outgrowth of the existing business
that was active in Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota and Wisconsin. See also Boett-
ger v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 324 (1968). The Service recently issued regulations that elimi-
nate the geographical distinctions, and broadly construe all operations as one business so long
as the new activities are in the same line of business. See Treas. Reg. 1.355-3(b)(3) (1989).
255. Notice 89-99, supra note 141, Part III(C)(3). The Service notes that the argument
"assumes a temporal element that is not apparent'in the wording. As written, the statute
requires only that the transferor's substantial interest exist at the time of the transfer." Id., n.
24. (emphasis in original). Recognizing that one.cannot gain a great degree of comfort from
closely parsing a statute that is so vaguely worded, the Service's position does eliminate con-
trivances exalting form in defeat of the statutory themes. The problem is that this particular
issue goes to the heart of the statute and the confusion as to what its theme is.
256. Example 15 of Notice 89-99, supra note 141, demonstrates this concept, but in the
situation of an existing enterprise owned by a child, to which the parent is contributing funds
in exchange for preferred stock. The existing enterprise versus new enterprise distinction per-
haps exalts the temporal nature of matters. In this case, the son could have created the enter-
prise as the sole owner, one minute before the subsequent capital contribution by father.
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or lead that is more an expectancy than an identifiable property right.257
Although the qualified start-up debt safe harbor of the TAMRA amend-
ments purports to address transferred goodwill, 258, it can be easily cir-
cumvented if the younger generation member can otherwise obtain funds
through family gifts, other means, or family loans structured around the
other debt safe harbor which does not contain such restrictions. 25 9
With the extremely wealthy families and successful businesses de-
scribed in Professor Cooper's article, the TAMRA safe harbors render
the statute largely ineffective. These families have the funds for loans to
their younger generation members, and with established businesses, the
repayment can certainly be made within the safe harbor time periods.
Although the regulations interpreting the supplied consideration test
have not been issued,, any attempt at imposing a definite time period for
determining direct or indirect transfers of consideration can be most
readily avoided by those individuals with alternate non-transferor family
sources of funds or the waiting time that wealth can allow.260 With the
debt safe harbors and supplied consideration rule acting in concert, to-
gether with the special safe harbor for short-term trusts, the amended
legislation clearly limits only the standard corporate recapitalization or
multi-class partnership, just one of the many freeze devices. Ironically,
the most restrictive treatment was reserved for the business buy-sell ar-
rangement; the structure for which application of the original version of
the statute was most vague and which structure is probably most applica-
ble to small and intermediate-sized family businesses, rather than en-
trenched fortunes.
It is the author's conclusion that the new legislation is a response to
a concern that was admittedly notorious, at least in academic and practi-
tioner circles, but was not a source of great untapped revenue. 261 Faced
with the difficulty in drafting an effective statute, and in view of the nu-
merous exceptions introduced by TAMRA, it is questionable whether
257. The most widely discussed example is that of the family which produces Est6e
Lauder perfumes. Reportedly, the new lines of products are commercially exploited by corpo-
rations primarily owned by the younger generation, such that over time the entire business,
with the natural attrition created by changes in consumer taste, will shift to the younger gener-
ation. Cooper, supra note 12, at 176. Another popular example was provided by former Presi-
dent Nixon's dealings with his daughter, Patricia, in which Patricia was made part of a very
successful Florida land venture promoted by a friend of Mr. Nixon. See S. SURREY, P. MC-
DANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 2, at 926-27.
258. See supra note 157.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 131.
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the statute will touch Professor Cooper's elite few. 262 With TAMRA,
Congress has repeated its established pattern of amending a comprehen-
sive statute to the point that it becomes applicable to none but the foolish
or those without the financial resources needed for effective avoidance
measures.
Conclusion
The estate valuation freeze techniques stretched the law that existed
prior to the Revenue Act of 1987. Even assuming that the technical as-
pects of the new legislation are clarified, it is difficult to optimistically
predict a successful curbing of many of the available techniques. More-
over, the TAMRA amendments may have reduced the statute to a com-
plex, yet ineffective piece of legislation. In light of the modest estimated
revenue gains from the statute, Congress might be well-advised to shift
its focus to raising revenues and overall simplification. A number of al-
ternatives are available. The missing ingredient, however, is a change in
public and congressional attitudes about reforming wealth transfer
taxation.
262. Professor Cooper received an estimate that only 2,400 persons had wealth in excess of
$10 million. Cooper, supra note 12, at 205. 1982 estimates indicated that 32,000 persons had a
net worth in excess of $5 million, while the number in the $1 million to $5 million range was
almost 376,000. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN,
Winter 1984-85, reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, TABLE No. 723 (108th ed. 1988). During
1986, only 900 estate tax returns were filed that reported gross estates in excess of $5 million.
See U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER AND
CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, reprinted in U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, TABLE
No. 486 (108th ed. 1988). Only 345 of the returns filed in 1985 reported a gross estate in
excess of $10 million. STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 77.
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